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ABSTRACT 
This project is part of a collaborative MSc training programme between the 
Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) and Cranfield University, aiming at 
enhancing the competitiveness of AVIC in both international and domestic 
aviation market through applying continuing airworthiness policies in the whole 
aircraft development process.  
The arrangement of the research project is that all students start with a Group 
Design Project which is based on the Flying Crane Project provided by AVIC. 
Individual research projects will address some aspects of the Flying Crane 
Project during the Group Design Project, and then further developed during the 
period for individual projects. The aim of this research is to apply the 
airworthiness requirements and the methodology of the Maintenance Steering 
Group logic (MSG-3) in the Flying Crane Project. This is because that 
maintenance is one of the key factors of Continuing Airworthiness, and MSG-3 
logic is the most accepted and approved method to develop scheduled 
maintenance for civil aircrafts.  
The main objectives of this project include: (1) To investigate current Continuing 
Airworthiness regulations, including European airworthiness requirements (as 
the main regulation to comply with) and Chinese airworthiness regulations (as 
an important reference and supplement to the research); (2) To investigate the 
main analysis methodology of reliability and maintainability, including Damage 
Tolerance and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA); (3) To analyse the 
data resulted from the Group Design Project using MSG-3 logic to produce a set 
of Continuing Airworthiness instructions, for the operator and maintenance 
organisation of the aircraft, from the design organization’s perspective; (4) To 
develop Continuing Airworthiness instructions for airline operators to compose 
maintenance programmes for Flying Crane aircrafts, including maintenance 
tasks and intervals for the selected airframe systems and structural components; 
and (5) To identify applicable maintenance organisations in China for Flying 
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Crane aircrafts in accordance with both European and Chinese airworthiness 
requirements. 
On completion of this research, two aspects of Continuing Airworthiness have 
been investigated, including maintenance programme and maintenance 
organization. With MSG-3 logic, the author developed the maintenance plan for 
three structural components (fuselage skin panel, wing root joint, and 
fin-fuselage attachment) and one airframe system (fuel system) based on results 
from the Group Design Project. The author also investigated the Chinese 
domestic aircraft maintenance companies, and selected suitable maintenance 
organizations based on technical and economical criteria. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Project Background 
This is a collaborative project between Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) and 
Cranfield University. With the aim of enhancing competitiveness in both 
international and domestic aviation industry, the Aviation Industries of China, 
the biggest aeronautical product manufacturer in China, started this training 
and research project in collaboration with the School of Engineering, Cranfield 
University in 2008. Since 2008 to 2010, AVIC has sent three cohorts of aircraft 
engineers to Cranfield University. 
The research project assigned to the students in the first three cohorts was 
mainly based on the design of the “Flying Crane”, a 130-seat civil aircraft under 
development in AVIC. All students started a Group Design Project, in which 
AVIC students experienced the whole procedure of civil aircraft design, 
including the Conceptual Design Phase, Preliminary Design Phase and 
Detailed Design Phase, followed by an individual project, all completed each 
within one year. Most of these students (including the author) extended or 
spread their research in Group Design Project phase as their topic of Individual 
Research Project. The author’s individual research topic is the application of 
continuing airworthiness policy in the whole aircraft development process, 
especially in the Chinese aviation industry. 
1.2 Airworthiness in the Chinese Aviation Industry 
Ever since the end of World War II, the development of civil aviation in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia has proved that, the capability 
of airworthiness certification is one of the critical factors in civil aircraft 
development. 
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Nowadays, Chinese aviation industry is experiencing a period of rapid 
development. However, compared with western countries which have mature 
aircraft development processes, procedures and technologies, airworthiness is 
still a weak point in the Chinese aviation business chain. 
Airworthiness certification of independent civil aircraft design in China started 
from the ARJ-21 (Advanced Regional Jet of 21st Century) project. Due to the 
certification plan, the Type Certificate of AJR21 is proposed to be released by 
the end of 2011. Therefore it is clear that, China still has no experience of 
maintaining an independent civil aircraft design under any airworthiness 
regulations. 
Consequently, Continuing Airworthiness, which covers operation and 
maintenance in aircrafts’ service life, is considered as one of the most serious 
“short board” of Chinese aviation industry. 
1.3 Overview of the Group Design Project 
As mentioned above, all students started with a Group Design Project. In the 
academic year 2010-11 Group Design Project, the author’s group focused on 
the Detailed Design Phase of the Flying Crane project, which is considered as 
the extension and continuance of the Preliminary Design Phase accomplished 
in the academic year 2009 project. In this group, the author was responsible 
for three parts of the work: passenger cabin layout, floor structure design, and 
airworthiness management. 
1.4 Overview of the Individual Research Project 
As mentioned previously, because of the lack of experience in designing and 
maintaining civil aircraft independently, airworthiness certification, especially 
Continuing Airworthiness is one of the main weak areas of Chinese aviation 
industry. Based on this background, the author carried out a research into 
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Continuing Airworthiness work during Type design phase of civil aircrafts, 
using data from the Flying Crane project. Note that the terminology ‘Type’ 
stands for a specific aircraft model in this thesis. 
Continuing Airworthiness is a series of tasks, covering almost every aspect of 
a Type of aircraft including design, certification, operation, and maintenance. 
Among those aspects, the author selected ‘maintenance’ as an application 
area aiming at developing the maintenance plan. The reasons behind the 
decision are the following: 
 The maintenance plan is supposed to be accomplished by the end of 
Detailed Design Phase and approved by the Regulatory Authority as a 
main supportive document for Type certification; 
 Most of required design and analysis data are available from the results of 
the Group Design Phase; and 
 In both the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulation (CCAR) and the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulation systems, the same logic 
Maintenance Steering Group – 3 (MSG-3) was employed as the guideline 
to developing the maintenance tasks and intervals. 
1.5 Project Aims and Objectives 
As previously mentioned, this research is an extension of the Group Design 
Project, which is based mainly on the results of airframe system and structural 
components design, and will address issues related to Continuing 
Airworthiness from aircraft manufacturer’s perspective.  
 
Therefore, the aim of this research is to prove one means of compliance to 
satisfying the EASA requirements related to Continuing Airworthiness, by 
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applying the airworthiness requirements and the methodology of the 
Maintenance Steering Group logic (MSG-3) in the Flying Crane Project of the 
Chinese Aviation Industries (AVIC). 
 
For the purpose of achieving the research aim, the following objectives were 
established: 
 To investigate current Continuing Airworthiness regulations, including 
European airworthiness requirements (as the main regulation to comply 
with) and Chinese airworthiness regulations (as an important reference 
and supplement to the research); 
 To investigate the main analysis methodology of reliability and 
maintainability, including Damage Tolerance and Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA); 
 To analyse the data resulted from the Group Design Project using MSG-3 
logic to produce a set of Continuing Airworthiness instructions, for the 
operator and maintenance organisation of the aircraft, from the design 
organization’s perspective; 
 To develop Continuing Airworthiness instructions for airline operators to 
compose maintenance programmes for Flying Crane aircrafts, including 
maintenance tasks and intervals for the selected airframe systems and 
structural components; and 
 To identify applicable maintenance organisations in China for Flying Crane 
aircrafts in accordance with both European and Chinese airworthiness 
requirements. 
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1.6 Thesis Structure 
The first Chapter of this thesis gives a general introduction to the research 
project, including the origin and purpose of the project, the main content of the 
Group Design Project and Individual Research Project, and the aim and 
objectives of this research. 
In Chapter Two, the author’s work accomplished in the Group Design Project 
is described, including passenger cabin layout, floor structure design, and 
airworthiness management. 
Literature review is the content of Chapter Three, as well as the methodology 
Maintenance Steering Group – 3 (MSG-3) logic and input from detailed design 
phase of this research. 
The research methodology is applied to specific design data in Chapter Four. 
In addition, it comes to a proposed scheduled maintenance plan, including 
maintenance tasks and intervals for selected structures and systems. 
Chapter Five contains an assessment of the Chinese aircraft maintenance 
organizations in accordance with airworthiness regulations and manufacturer’s 
requirements. 
In the end, the research outcome is concluded in Chapter Seven. And some 
comments from the author’s perspective are proposed for future research. 
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2 The Group Design Project 
During the Group Design Project phase in academic year 2010 – 2011, the 
author’s group focused on the Detailed Design Phase of a 130-seat airliner 
Flying Crane, based on the results of the preliminary design phase from the 
previous group in academic year 2009 – 2010. 
In this chapter, the author will present the main results from his work in Group 
Design Project phase: 
 Cabin Layout; 
 Floor Design; and 
 Airworthiness Management. 
2.1 Cabin Layout Design 
For the cabin layout design, the author mostly kept the design style and 
functional components from the preliminary design phase.  
To verify the internal arrangement, the author collected and compared the seat 
pitch and seat width of several most satisfactory airline worldwide with Flying 
Cranes. And then, based on the investigation and comparison of several most 
professional aerospace internal suppliers on the market, the author selected 
Recaro Aircraft Seating as the seating supplier of the Flying Crane. Their 
products BV3510 and BL4400 were the prototypes with those the CATIA CAD 
models of economy class and Business class seats were developed. 
In addition, the author finalised the 3D-model of passenger cabin with CATIA 
V5 R17. The CATIA model contained passenger seats (economy and 
business class), galleys, wardrobes, lavatories, emergency equipments 
(including fire extinguishers and emergency lights). 
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2.2 Cabin Floor Design 
This part of work includes the floor panel design and floor supporting structure 
design. 
For the floor panel, there were three general requirements: to strengthen the 
high load areas, to avoid corrosion, and to use materials with light weight and 
high resistance. 
The author designed the entire floor panel combined with two different types of 
composite materials, which are different in their facing thickness and core 
density. Their upper and lower facing materials are glass reinforced epoxy; 
meanwhile the fill-ins are aramid honeycomb. The floor panel designed is 
shown in Figure 2-1. 
This type of material is widely used and soundly verified by world’s main 
airliner manufacturers such as Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier. 
 
Figure 2-1 Floor Panel Designed 
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For the floor beam and floor vertical struts design, on the basis of the 
preliminary design, the author changed the material and redesigned the cross 
section of floor beam. And the vertical floor struts design, which had not been 
covered in preliminary design phase, was finished in this work. 
The specific analysis and calculation process is shown in Appendix A. 
2.3 Airworthiness Management 
In the Preliminary Design Phase, other researchers have already determined 
the Airworthiness Regulations to comply with, the airworthiness management 
workflow, and the main method of airworthiness management. Therefore, in 
the Detailed Design Phase, the author followed the airworthiness work related 
to the structure design from the Preliminary Design Phase, and updated in 
accordance with the results accomplished in the Detailed Design Phase. 
In the Group Design Project, the author was responsible for: 
 Making the Type certification plan for Flying Crane project; 
 Adding and adjusting the choice of clauses in CCAR-25; 
 Updating the Airworthiness Compliance Matrix. 
This part of work will be described in Appendix B. 
2.4 Group Design Project Conclusion 
In the Group Design Project, the author was responsible for passenger cabin 
layout, cabin floor, and airworthiness. 
From passenger cabin and cabin floor design, the author learnt much about 
internal components of aircrafts, component supplier assessment, as well as 
aircraft structure design and analysis, which were all totally new to the author. 
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On the other hand, with the research of airworthiness, the author deeply 
understood the concept and tasks of airworthiness as the role of manufacturer, 
which were considered as the basis of the author’s Individual Research Project 
in Continuing Airworthiness. 
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3 Literature Review 
In this chapter, the author presented a general introduction to airworthiness, 
including main airworthiness organisations and their regulations, especially 
those related to Continuing Airworthiness. In addition, the methodology of 
MSG-3 (Maintenance Steering Group - 3) logic was presented. Finally, seven 
of the most common non-destructive testing methods were investigated. 
3.1 Definition of Airworthiness 
According to a number of published articles, the concept of AIRWORTHINESS 
is defined in a variety of ways. However, there are commonalities among these 
articles, i.e., the close link between airworthiness and safety. 
“Safety is the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury, or 
loss” (Merriam-Webster Online, available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/, 
accessed 10 Sep 2010). 
When talking about safety related to aviation industry, the concept of 
Airworthiness is used to assess whether an aircraft is safe enough or not. 
The following shows several different definitions of airworthiness based on 
different perspectives and understanding: 
“Fit for operation in the air” (Merriam-Webster Online available at: 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/, accessed 10 Sep 2010). 
“A definition of airworthiness can be found in the Italian RAI-ENAC Technical 
Regulations: for an aircraft, or aircraft part, [airworthiness] is the possession of 
the necessary requirements for flying in safe conditions, within allowable limits” 
(Filippo De Florio, 2006). 
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The author understands airworthiness as an inherent property of aeronautical 
products, which can be created and maintained by human-being, with the aim 
to ensure the safety of flight within expected environment. 
Filippo De Florio (2006) stated that, there are three main conventional flight 
safety factors: man, the environment, and the machine. These factors act in 
series, not in parallel, just like three links of chain representing flight safety, 
which is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1 Flight safety represented as three links in a chain 
 (Filippo De Florio, 2006) 
From the above definitions, airworthiness is a baseline, in other words, a 
series of minimum requirements for an aircraft’s manufacturer and operator to 
meet. 
Note that in this thesis, a specific aircraft model is called a ‘Type’. In the Type 
design and manufacture phase, “machine” is the primary factor of the three 
safety factors (man, environment and machine) to be focused on. The 
manufacturers of aircrafts and components concentrate on the acquisition of 
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TC (Type Certificate), PC (Production Certificate), and C of A (the Certificate of 
Airworthiness). 
Once an aircraft is delivered to an operator and/or a maintenance organisation, 
accompanied by the introduction of Continuing Airworthiness (which will be 
explain in more detail later) during operation phase, the other two factors, man 
and environment come into the stage. 
There’s one point needs to be emphasized, which is that, there is no strict 
boundary between the phase of type design/manufacture and operation. For 
instance, before the delivery of an aircraft, the manufacture should issue the 
maintenance plan to the operator. The document would include required 
qualification and operation guide for maintenance personnel. The operator has 
the obligation to feedback about the aircraft’s defect and performance to the 
manufacturer to improve the maintenance plan as well. 
3.2 Main Airworthiness Authorities and Standards 
3.2.1 The International Civil Aviation Organization 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was initially launched and 
headquartered in Montreal, Canada. It has a history of over 60 years. Having 
been developed continuously since its establishment, ICAO has over 180 
contracting states at present. ICAO concentrates on developing a safe, sound, 
effective and retainable civil aviation industry. (ICAO, available at: 
http://www.icao.int/) 
To achieve its objective in civil aviation, ICAO established and has been 
implementing and completing 18 annexes, which are also entitled ISRP, 
International Standards and Recommended Practices. The International 
Standards are commonly agreed and executed as directives by every member 
states. Recommended Practises are the most accepted but not the restricted 
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approach to achieve the standards. Among all these 18 annexes, Annex 6 
(Operation of Aircraft) and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft) have close 
relationship with Continuing Airworthiness. 
3.2.2 The European Aviation Safety Agency 
When talking about the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA) has to be mentioned. Before EASA, the competent 
authority was JAA, which established and implemented the Joint Aviation 
Requirements (JARs), and enabled the collaboration among member states, 
as well as external authorities. (EASA, available at: 
http://easa.europa.eu/home.php) 
However, JAR was not able to perform legally to every member states within 
JAR. Member states needed to develop their own aviation regulation systems, 
which delayed the integrity of European Union in a certain level. 
In that condition, EASA was organized as an independent European legal 
body, which administrates and issues requirements in a legal level. 
EASA takes responsibility for drafting new legislation, implementing safety 
rules, issuing approvals for products and organisations, and authorizing 
non-EU operators. 
EASA’s regulation structure could be clearly illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2 Regulations Structure of EASA (EASA, 2010) 
The Basic Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 Feb 2008 states common rules in the field of civil aviation 
and establishes the EASA. It is applied to design, production, maintenance 
and operation of aeronautical products, parts, appliance, and personnel and 
organisations involved in these procedures as well. And the principal objective 
is to establish a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in Europe. (The 
European Parliament and the Council, 2008) 
One of the Implementing Rules, Regulation No 1702/2003, is “for the 
airworthiness and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, 
parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production 
organisations” (EASA, 2003). It contains Part-21 as its Annex I, and 10 
appendices consisting of EASA unified forms related to certification 
procedures including application, authorisation, permits, release, etc. The Part 
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21 is about certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, 
and of design and production organisations. Some clauses selected out from 
Part 21 are closely related to the author’s study. These clauses will be list later 
on in this chapter. 
The EASA airworthiness codes, which are Certification Specifications, derived 
from and have replaced JARs step by step since the establishment of EASA. 
The CS codes are compulsorily prescribed and implemented by the authority. 
The technical requirements defined in CS codes are mostly impact on 
aeronautical products’ design and manufacture phase, which is considered as 
initial airworthiness stage. 
The CS-25, Certification Specification for Large Aeroplanes, altogether with its 
AMCs and GMs (which will be introduced later on) have been taken into the 
author’s study. The particular clauses will be list later in this chapter. 
The Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 is the Implementing Rule on the 
Continuing Airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and 
appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in 
these tasks. It establishes common technical requirements and administrative 
procedures for the Continuing Airworthiness of aeronautical products. Annex I, 
Part-M, Continuing Airworthiness management and Annex II, Part-145, 
Maintenance Organization Approval, is both closely related to the author’s 
work. The Annex III, Part-66, Certifying staff and Annex IV, Part-147, Training 
organizations requirements are both involved in the study as well. 
Part M – Continuing Airworthiness 
Part-145 is the Annex II of Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003. It presents the 
requirements for the maintenance organisations to get qualified as approved 
maintenance organisations from the Continuing Airworthiness point of view, 
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and activities and procedures the competent authorities would take to have a 
maintenance organisation under certification due to different conditions. 
Part-145 regulates applicant organisations from aspects of, such as, personnel, 
facilities, system (including data transfer and occurrence reporting, etc.), 
quality, etc. Likewise, ACMs and GMs to Part-145 are important supplement 
and directive material during the process of study. 
Part-145 Maintenance Organization Approval 
Part-145 is Annex II of Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003. It presents the 
requirements for the maintenance organisations to get qualified as approved 
maintenance organisations from the Continuing Airworthiness point of view, 
and activities and procedures the competent authorities would take to have a 
maintenance organisation under certification due to different conditions. 
Part-145 regulates applicant organisations from aspects of, such as, personnel, 
facilities, system (including data transfer and occurrence reporting), and quality. 
Likewise, ACMs and GMs to Part-145 are important supplement and directive 
material during the process of study. 
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material 
Refer to the definition officially given by EASA, the Acceptable Means of 
Compliance (AMC) serves as “means by which the certification requirements 
contained in the Basic Regulation, and its implementing rules, and more 
specifically in their annexes (also referred as ‘Parts’) can be met by the 
applicant”. (EASA, 2010) 
From the definition, AMC is a means extremely strongly recommended by the 
Agency for the applicant to meet the requirements from EASA airworthiness 
codes and implementing rules. However, it is not compulsory. The applicant is 
always free to choose other means to show compliance. But the assessment 
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and judgement on the alternative would in most situations cause much more 
unnecessary and avoidable extra matters and costs. Therefore, in this study, 
the author directly takes the means provided via AMC for the most part. It will 
be clearly identified when an alternative is taken. 
The Guidance Material (GM) is an illustrative document to help understanding 
the related requirement. It is worked out to promote the application of 
airworthiness related rules as well as AMC. (Yongke Yang, 2009) 
3.2.3 The Civil Aviation Administration of China 
The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) is the aviation competent 
authority in China. 
Within effects of years, China has established her own airworthiness 
regulation and management system. The structure of China’s airworthiness 
regulation, CCARs, is built mainly based on the US FARs, and being 
synchronously updated where applicable as well. 
The CCAR regulations selected and utilised by the author will be list later in 
this chapter. 
3.2.4 Relevant Airworthiness Requirements 
 EASA Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003, Annex Part 21, Certification of 
aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, and of design and 
production organisations; 
 EASA CS 25, Large Aeroplanes; 
 EASA Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003, Annex I, Part-M; 
 EASA Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003, Annex II, Part-145; 
 CCAR25, Airworthiness standards: transport category aircrafts; 
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 CCAR43, Maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding, and 
alteration; 
 CCAR145, Maintenance Organisation Approval; 
 CCAR, AC-121-53, Civil aircraft maintenance plan; 
 CCAR, AC-121/135-67, Maintenance Review Board Report 
 CCAR, AC-121/135-49, Establishment and approval of Main Minimum 
Equipment List for Civil Aircraft. 
The author decided to select the EASA airworthiness system as the main 
requirements to comply with meanwhile taking the Chinese CCAR regulations 
as references for the following reasons: 
1. Experimental materials, reference sources related to EASA requirements 
are much more abundant and accessible than that related to CCAR 
regulations. 
2. This project is a research project. The CCAR regulations have already 
been involved in the GDP phase. The author would like to investigate the 
EASA requirements during the Individual Research Project phase to extend 
the scope of his knowledge. 
3.3 Continuing Airworthiness 
As previously mentioned, safety is what airworthiness always focus on, 
undoubtedly not only temporarily, but also continuously. Ever since the issuing 
of Type Certificate and the delivery to the owner/operator, the aircraft must be 
maintained in the same airworthiness condition as when it was certified. 
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Generally speaking, the ultimate objective of Continuing Airworthiness is to 
keep the aircraft (or other aeronautical products) maintained at the Type 
Certificate airworthiness standard throughout the whole operational life. 
The following is an official definition of Continuing Airworthiness. 
“Continuing or continued airworthiness is all of the processes ensuring that, at 
any time in its life, an aircraft complies with the technical conditions fixed to the 
issue of the certificate of airworthiness and is in a condition for safe operation” 
– ICAO DOC 9713(John W Bristow and Simon Place, 2010) 
Figure 3-3 shows the relationship and collaborative type of the three main 
participants (the Regulator, the Type Certificate holder, and the operator) of 
Continuing Airworthiness. 
 
Figure 3-3 Main Players in Continued Airworthiness (John W Bristow and 
Simon Place, 2010) 
With the definition of Continuing Airworthiness and the relationship of 
Continuing Airworthiness participants shown in Figure 3-3, it won’t be too hard 
to get a conceptual realization of what Continuing Airworthiness aims to (to 
keep the aircraft airworthy), who does Continuing Airworthiness (Type 
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Certificate Holder, operator and competent authority – there will be 
maintenance and management organisations due to further investigation), and 
how to implement Continuing Airworthiness (which will be expanded upon in 
the following chapters). 
3.3.1 Content of Continuing Airworthiness 
It’s necessary to declare in advance that, due to the limitation of time, this 
project is based on the Type Certificate holder’s perspective. Consequently, 
from this point on, we will mainly investigate from the Type Certificate holder’s 
point of view as well. 
About Continuing Airworthiness, It is clearly indicated in Part-21 that,  
i. The Type Certificate holder has the responsibility to, and should have a 
system to collect, investigate, and analyse data of failure, malfunctions 
and defects. 
ii. When an airworthiness directive has to be issued by the agency to 
correct the unsafe condition, or to require the performance of an 
inspection, the Type Certificate holder shall follow and execute. 
iii. The Type Certificate holder shall furnish at least one set of complete 
instructions for continued airworthiness. 
Because of the limitation of actual conditions, it is not possible to deal with the 
first and second item. Therefore, in this study, the author has narrowed his 
investigation on the Continuing Airworthiness document provided to the 
operator from the Type Certificate holder. 
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3.3.2 Continuing Airworthiness Instruction 
In accordance with point M.A.302 (d) of Part-M (EASA, 2003), the aircraft 
maintenance programme must establish compliance with instructions for 
Continuing Airworthiness issued by the holders of the Type Certificate. 
From this point, the Continuing Airworthiness instruction is the basis of 
maintenance programme, and the maintenance programme is derived from 
Continuing Airworthiness instruction. 
Basically, the maintenance programme should contain check periods, 
pre-flight maintenance tasks details, inspection tasks and periods 
(intervals/frequencies) for parts, check periods for components, specific 
structural maintenance programmes, CDCCL (Critical Design Configuration 
Control Limitations), component overhaul/replacement periods, mandatory life 
limitations, CMR’s (Certification Maintenance Requirements), AD’s 
(Airworthiness Directives) , reliability programme details. 
3.3.3 Comparison between CCAR & EASA Continuing 
Airworthiness Regulation System 
Continuing Airworthiness is identified and interpreted in different approaches 
by CCAR and EASA regulation system. 
However, the internal safety standard and the final intentional objective of 
these two regulation systems are almost the same. For instance, both CCAR 
and EASA regulation take MSC-3 logic as the philosophy to determine the 
maintenance programme for aircrafts. 
i. Regulations Structure 
In CCAR, the concept of Continuing Airworthiness is not directly explained by 
one single requirement. The CCAR Continuing Airworthiness system is 
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combined by several individual regulations, together with their AC (Advisory 
Circular, another denomination of Acceptable Means of Certification), which 
cover every main aspect of Continuing Airworthiness, including (but not only): 
 CCAR-121, Certification Requirements for Air Transport Operator of Large 
Aircrafts 
 CCAR-135, Management Regulations for General Aviation Operation 
 CCAR-145, Certification Rules for Maintenance Organisations of Civil 
Aircrafts 
 CCAR-43, General Rules for Maintenance and Rebuilding 
In EASA, Continuing Airworthiness requirements are more structured and 
systemized. All the requirements for design organizations, operator, 
maintenance organizations, and Continuing Airworthiness management 
organizations are all integrated in the implementing rules and its annex, Part M 
(and AMC’s). 
ii. Acceptable Means of Certification 
In CCAR Advisory Circulars, it could be clearly realized that, which 
organization the AC is based on specifically, and what that organization should 
do due to the AC. 
For instance, the CCAR AC-91-11, Requirements for Continuing Airworthiness 
documents of aircrafts, clearly identifies that, in the type certification stage, 
what kinds of documents the design organization is required to provide to 
obtain the Type Certificate. Meanwhile, the contents, specifications, formality, 
and schedule of these documents are identified in this AC as well. 
Comparatively, EASA AMCs are not described as directly as CCAR ACs. 
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In conclusion, EASA and CCAR Continuing Airworthiness regulation system 
have almost the same safety standard and philosophy (MSG-3 logic). However, 
EASA’s Continuing Airworthiness system has a more structured and 
systemized regulation structure than CCAR’s do. To make up this shortage, 
CCAR provides more clear description to the regulations via Advisory Circulars 
than EASA do with AMCs. Thus, when we develop the Continuing 
Airworthiness plan in accordance with EASA requirements, CCAR ACs can be 
a significant reference and supplement to the investigation. 
3.4 Introduction to ATA MSG-3 Logic 
Within the type design stage, the Continuing Airworthiness would be initially 
established. During this period, the identification of maintenance tasks and the 
prediction of maintenance intervals can be one of the most important 
assignments concerning Continuing Airworthiness. 
3.4.1 Development of MSG-3 
The ATA (Air Transport Association) MSG-3 (Maintenance Steering Group - 3) 
logic is the most widely used methodology to determine the maintenance tasks, 
and to estimate the maintenance intervals before the type aircraft comes into 
operation. 
The very first MSG document; Handbook MSG-1 was developed by 
representatives of various airlines in July 1968. It contained decision logic and 
inter-airline/manufacturer procedures for developing scheduled maintenance 
for the new Boeing 747 aircraft. (ATA, 2003) In 2003, the MSG-3 Revision 
2003 (not the latest issued, but the highest edition available at internet) was 
issued by ATA. 
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3.4.2 Mission of MSG-3 
The objective of MSG-3 is to present a means for developing the scheduled 
maintenance tasks and intervals which will be acceptable to the regulatory 
authorities, the operators, and the manufacturers, from both safety and 
economic point of view. 
Before the processes of development, the scheduled maintenance tasks were 
divided into two groups; scheduled tasks (at specified intervals) and 
non-scheduled tasks. 
In the group of scheduled tasks, it covers from the most common task, which is 
lubrication and servicing to the most extreme task, which is discarding. And the 
non-scheduled tasks take place as a subsequence of scheduled task, or a 
functional failure, or a series of data analysis. 
And the mission of MSG-3 could be divided into 4 sections; airframe systems 
(including powerplant and APU’s), structural components, zonal inspections, 
and L/HIRF. Each section can be used independently from other sections. 
3.4.3 The Author’s Understanding about MSG-3 
The following are the author’s understands of MSG-3 procedures based on his 
own investigation and study. 
I. MSG-3 carries out a top-to-bottom logical approach to classify the 
functional failure of systems/sub-systems, components, and parts, and 
then determines the maintenance tasks due to categories. 
II. The input of MSG-3 is occurrence of functional failures. The applicability 
of inputs is critical for the accuracy of the results. 
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III. Significant Items (including Maintenance Significant Items and 
Structural Significant Items) can be emphasised in MSG-3. Hence, the 
identification of significant items is significant as well. 
IV. For structural maintenance, Fatigue Damage deserves more attention 
in type design phase. 
V. For other system/sub-systems, components, and parts, which 
developed based on experience data, the collection and analysis of 
data can be important. 
3.5 The Continuing Airworthiness Applied on Flying Crane 
Project 
As described in previous sections, the methodology of author’s research is 
MSG-3 logic. The output of this research is a proposed maintenance plan for 
selected airframe systems and structural components of Flying Crane, which 
includes maintenance tasks and intervals. And the input is the functions, 
function failures, failure effects, and failure causes of the objective airframe 
systems, and fatigue damage data of the objective structural components. 
The required data can be provided by system reliability and maintainability 
people and particular designer of each components of the Flying Crane project. 
The source of author’s individual research is the results of these colleagues 
during their group design phase. 
Hence, it is necessary to clarify first that, what valuable data can be provided 
and selected from the group design phase. 
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3.5.1 Airframe System 
As previously mentioned, input is critical to aircraft maintenance developed 
under MSG-3 logic. Without specific and adequate data generated in detailed 
design phase, there will be nowhere to start the analysis procedure. 
In the group design phase, the systems reliability and maintainability people 
developed a range of analysis tools related to system functions, including FHA 
(Functional Hazard Assessment), FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and PSSA 
(Preliminary System Safety Analysis) for the ice protection system and 
surveillance system, as well as the FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) 
for fuel system. Among these analysis tools, FMEA provides applicable 
information that can be directly adopted as the basis to develop maintenance 
plan on. Thus, the fuel system was selected. 
3.5.2 Structural Component 
For structure design, fatigue analysis results are directly related to structural 
maintenance plan. 
In the Group Design Project, structure designers chose the most widely 
accepted fatigue design type, Damage Tolerance Design. With this design 
method, the length and growth rate of fatigue crack can be calculated, and the 
structural inspection interval was suggested by the designer as well. The data 
resulted from Damage Tolerance analysis is one of the most essential inputs 
of MSG-3 logic. 
The author had three typical structural components analyzed using MSG-3 
logic. The selected structures were fuselage skin panel, fin-fuselage 
attachment, and wing root joint. 
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3.6 Research to Non-destructive Tests 
Within scheduled maintenance processes, Non-destructive Test (NDT) is 
widely applied to discover most types of damage occurred on aircraft 
structures. 
Literally according to the name, Non-destructive Test is a series of inspection 
techniques used to find out scratches or defaults of metallic material or 
component insides without causing any damage. 
Material seams (such as fatigue scratch on significant structural items) and 
internal contaminants (such as entrapped water and corrosion inside the 
airplane skin panel) can be revealed during scheduled maintenance tasks 
using Non-destructive Tests, and then followed by maintenance activities 
against those defaults. 
In this section, the author will investigate and discuss seven of the most 
common Non-destructive Test methods which have the possibilities to be 
applied to the scheduled maintenance of aircraft structures, including Visual 
Inspection, Radiographic Inspection, Ultrasonic Testing, Eddy Current Testing, 
Dye Penetrant Inspection, Magnetic Particle Inspection, and Infrared 
Inspection.  
3.6.1 Visual Inspection 
Visual Inspection is the basic and primary method among all Non-destructive 
Tests. It could lead to the decision that whether other NDT is applicable. 
This category could be subcategorized into General Visual Inspection (GVI) 
and Detailed Visual Inspection (DVI). GVI means that an inspection is 
implemented by naked eyes without any assistant tools. Oppositely, DVI is 
aided by magnifiers, mirrors, and accessibility enhancement equipments such 
as borescopes or introscopes. 
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Visual Inspection is the oldest and still the most widely used method of 
Non-destructive Inspections because of its simplicity, quickness and economy. 
Common uses: 
The most common use of GVI is to find out visible fatigue scratch on external 
surfaces, as well as any other type of visible scratches on accessible surfaces. 
With optical aids such as borescopes and television camera, DVI is also used 
to discover damage on internal surfaces or piping insides. 
In addition, other advanced NDT methods can be used according to the results 
from Visual Inspection. 
Limitations: 
The result of Visual Inspection is valid only for surfaces with good condition. 
Basically, cleaning is necessary before the application of Visual Inspection. 
Furthermore, de-painting, degreasing, and sandblasting can be needed in 
some certain situations. 
Additionally, human factor affects the results of Visual Inspection significantly. 
Results can be different depending on the training level of the inspectors, the 
physical and mental condition of one single inspector, the accessibility of 
illumination, and the size of acceptable defect comparing to the whole 
inspection area. 
3.6.2 Radiographic Inspection 
Industrial Radiographic Inspection includes X-ray Inspection and Gamma-ray 
(ɣ-ray) Inspection. Radiography technique is used to demonstrate a shadow 
image of a solid item in order to discover internal defects which are invisible to 
direct eyesight. 
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Figure 3-4 Layout of Radiographic Inspection (NDT Education Resource 
Center, 2011) 
The general layout of Radiographic Inspection is shown in Figure 3-4. Because 
the penetrative rate of radiation varies according to the mass and type of 
objectives, the intensity of radiograph penetrated through the inspected items 
varies between different material intensity, style and size of internal defects, 
and material thickness. Thus, a distributed intensity of radiation will be receive 
by the film and illustrated by photosensitive material. 
Common uses: 
Radiographic Inspection is a very widely used type of NDT. It is used to assess 
a wide range of both metallic and non-metallic material thickness levels, even 
if the shape is complex (as long as both sides are accessible). And because of 
the inspection results are permanent (forty years at least), with appropriate 
 30 
equipments and sufficient look angles, real-time radiographic images can be 
realized. 
Limitations: 
Both sides of the objective have to be accessible. The probability of inspection 
will be reduced severely when cracks are not oriented parallel to the X-ray 
beam. Radiographed marginal discontinuities require much more careful 
recognization by qualified personnel comparing with gross flaws. Both X-ray 
and Gamma-ray harm human-beings’ health. And the process is expensive, 
and takes a lot of time. 
3.6.3 Ultrasonic Testing 
Ultrasonic is referred to as sound waves at frequency above 20,000 Hz. And 
the range of frequencies used in Ultrasonic Testing is from less than 0.1 to 
larger than 15 MHz.  
Because sound wave can be reflected by the boundary of different mediums, 
the ultrasonic wave will be reflected in different period and amount of energy. 
This difference can be analyzed to determine the presence of internal flaw or 
change on thickness. 
The layout of Ultrasonic Testing is shown in Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5 Layout of Ultrasonic Testing (NDT Education Resource Center, 
2011) 
Common uses: 
Being applicable for inspecting internal defects, Ultrasonic Testing is frequently 
compared with Radiographic Inspection.  
Because Radiographic Inspection is good with finding out defects parallel with 
radiation beams, and Ultrasonic Testing is good with inspecting defects 
vertical to sound wave beams, they are significant supplementary method to 
each other. 
With different angles of incidence and correspondent calculations, the depth 
and size of internal defects can be accurately measured. 
In addition, since the accessibility of only one single side needed, no harm to 
human-being health, and much less expensive (no film needed), Ultrasonic 
Testing is more recommended in conditions that Radiographic Inspection is 
also applicable, although it does have its own shortages. 
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Limitations: 
Comparing with Radiographic Inspection, Ultrasonic Testing is suitable for 
thicker surfaces and defects vertical to sound beams. Higher surface condition 
is required in order to avoid interfere to inspection. Operators need to be 
trained more extensively than other NDT methods. 
3.6.4 Eddy Current Testing 
Electric current flowing in a coil generates magnetic field. When the electric 
current varies, the generated magnetic field varies accordingly. When the coil 
is placed near a conductive material, the changing magnetic field causes 
current flows in the conductive material. These currents are called Eddy 
Currents. 
Thus, for conductive materials, the conductivity, permeability, and defects 
on/near surface can be measured inspected by measuring the magnetic field 
generated by eddy currents itself. This is how Eddy Current Testing works. (As 
shown in Figure 3-6) 
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Figure 3-6 Layout of Eddy Current Testing (NDT Education Resource 
Center, 2011) 
Common uses: 
According to the principle of Eddy Current Testing, its main usage is to inspect 
properties related to conductivity changing, e.g. electrical conductivity, coating 
thickness, metal sorting, and surface condition (corrosion, heat damage, 
hardness). 
Because the probe is not needed to touch the objective surface, Eddy Current 
Testing can be used to discover surface damage in some conditions as well. 
Limitations: 
Obviously, Eddy Current Testing is only applicable for conductive material 
such as metal. And Ferromagnetic materials require special treatment to 
address magnetic permeability. 
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Because of the characteristic of magnetic field, defects lying parallel to coil 
winding direction can be undetected. 
The training requirements are comparatively higher. 
3.6.5 Dye Penetrant Inspection 
Dye Penetrant Inspection (DPI) is probably the most extensively used one 
among all NDT methods. 
The primary principle of DPI is CAPILLARITY phenomenon. Capillarity 
happens when a penetrant material bath is applied on a clean surface of an 
objective. Removing excess penetrant material, the material that already 
penetrated into surfaces cracks will be pulled out and dyed by the application 
of Developer in the next step. Then, it is easy to detect any surface flaws under 
a certain level of illumination. 
 
Figure 3-7 "Capillarity Phenomenon" during Dye Penetrant Inspection 
(NDT Education Resource Center, 2011) 
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Common uses: 
Because of its effectiveness and convenience, Dye Penetrant Inspection is 
widely used to locate surface cracks, especially for large areas and complex 
surfaces which could be difficult for other NDT methods. 
Limitations: 
Only surface defects can be detected by Dye Penetrant Inspection.  
The inspected surface needs to be cleaned thoroughly. In some conditions, 
special cleaning processes are necessary, such as vapour de-grease and 
sandblast.  
Penetrant material is inflammable and harmful to human-being heath. 
3.6.6 Magnetic Particle Inspection 
The purpose of Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) is quite similar with Dye 
Penetrant Inspection. The major difference is that, MPI is only applicable to 
ferromagnetic materials. 
In MPI, detection of cracks depends on the magnetic leakage fields, which are 
known as the disturbed, resembled magnetic lines caused by surface flaw of 
ferromagnetic objectives. 
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Figure 3-8 Layout of Magnetic Particle Inspection (NDT Education 
Resource Center, 2011) 
Common uses: 
Magnetic Particle Inspection could be considered as an alternative of Dye 
Penetrant Inspection for ferromagnetic material. However, MPI has one more 
advantage, which is that defects not deep under surfaces can be discovered 
by MPI. 
Limitations: 
There is one single limitation different than DPI, which is that the MPI is only 
applicable for ferromagnetic materials. 
3.6.7 Infrared Inspection 
Infrared Inspection is one means of Thermal Inspections.  
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Within this type of inspection, the objective is heated by infrared radiation, 
whilst its resulting temperature and/or thermal gradient is recorded and 
displayed. Correlating the results with pre-settled standards, the defects can 
be identified. 
This mushrooming technique was firstly introduced to aviation industry in 90s 
of 20th century. It has been more and more widely utilized because of obtaining 
relatively extensive application, rapid procedure, large inspection area, and 
visualized result. 
In addition, there is no contact between infrared generator and inspected item, 
and the heating can be easily controlled by adjusting the intensity of infrared 
radiation. 
Common uses: 
Internal damage caused by external impact (especially on composite material), 
fatigue scratch, corrosion (especially on internal surface), entrapped water in 
the honeycomb structure or foam material of fuselage. 
Limitations: 
The accuracy of results can be affected by surface emissivities because of 
surfaces with different materials. Surface emission has to be known before the 
inspection processes. Infrared sensors with high response need cooling with 
liquid nitrogen to reduce internal noise. The cost of sensors and 
instrumentation is relatively high.  
3.6.8 Comparison of Non-destructive Testing Methods 
A comparison of the characteristics of different NDT methods presented above 
is shown in the following Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 Comparison of NDT Methods 
NDT Method Instruments 
Applicable 
Material Types 
Applicable 
Location 
Inspection 
Objective 
Other Limitations 
Visual Inspection 
Naked Eyes or 
magnifiers, 
mirrors, 
borescopes, Close 
Circuit 
Television, etc. 
All material types 
Any visible, 
accessible and 
clean area 
Visible fatigue 
scratch on external 
surfaces and any 
other visible 
damages 
Accessibility of 
illumination, high 
training requirements 
Radiographic 
Inspection 
X-ray or Gamma-ray 
generator, films 
Metallic and 
non-metallic 
Both side 
accessibility 
required 
Material thickness 
(thinner), 
internal defects 
(parallel with 
radiation beams) 
harmful to health 
Ultrasonic Testing 
Ultrasonic 
instrument (Pulse 
or 
Continuous-Wave) 
Metallic and 
non-metallic 
Single side 
accessibility 
required 
Material thickness 
(thicker), 
internal defects 
(vertical to 
soundwave beams), 
measurement of 
internal defects 
high training 
requirements 
Eddy Current Testing 
Different types of 
coils, Display 
Conductive 
material only 
Surfaces not 
complex 
electrical 
conductivity, 
coating thickness, 
defects parallel to coil 
undetected, high 
training requirements 
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NDT Method Instruments 
Applicable 
Material Types 
Applicable 
Location 
Inspection 
Objective 
Other Limitations 
corrosion, heat 
damage, hardness 
Dye Penetrant 
Inspection 
Surface cleaning 
instrument, 
penetrant 
material, 
developer 
Metallic and 
non-metallic 
Large areas and 
complex surfaces 
(cleaning 
required) 
surface cracks only 
harmful to health, 
inflammable 
Magnetic Particle 
Inspection 
Magnetic particle 
instrument 
Ferromagnetic 
material only 
Large areas and 
complex surfaces 
(cleaning 
required) 
surface and not 
deep defects only 
ferromagnetic material 
only 
Infrared Inspection 
Infrared 
generator, heat 
sensor, display 
Material without 
emissive coating 
Areas without 
emissive coating 
internal damage of 
composite, 
corrosion on 
internal surface, 
entrapped water 
inside fuselage 
high costs, cooling 
needed 
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3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the author described the concept of airworthiness, Continuing 
Airworthiness, as well as the main regulatory authorities in the world, together 
with the regulations they issued. Meanwhile, the regulation to comply with and 
the methodology of this research were selected. And initial analysis to MSG-3 
logic was presented as well. Then, the author reviewed the data related to 
Continuing Airworthiness and identified those were required by this research. 
In the end, a research to common Non-destructive Testing, which would be 
taken as scheduled maintenance tasks, was presented. 
 
  
 41 
4 Scheduled Maintenance Development Based On 
MSG-3 Logic 
In this chapter, the author applied the previously introduced MSG-3 
(Maintenance Steering Group - 3) logic on the results from the Detailed Design 
Phase of Flying Crane project (the Group Design Project) to propose 
scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for selected structures and 
airframe system. 
4.1 Obligations of Type Certificate Holders 
Type Certificate Holder (TCH) is an organization that has applied and obtained 
a Type Certificate of an aeronautical product. Normally, the prime 
manufacturer of an aircraft, or engine, or airborne equipment is considered as 
a Type Certificate Holder. 
In this study, the author’s role can be considered similar to a Type Certificate 
Holder’s. 
Generally, from the perspective of Continuing Airworthiness, a TCH has three 
fundamental obligations in the whole design and service life of an aircraft 
Type. 
 To generate Continuing Airworthiness instructions, which are the basis 
and guideline for operators to build aircraft maintenance programmes. 
These instructions are supposed to consist of specifications for operation 
and maintenance, interface information between main components, and 
manuals for airborne equipments. 
 To collect and analyze feedback from operators and directives from 
regulatory authority, in order to keep improving the design and 
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maintenance programme of the aircraft, as well as revising the defects and 
problems detected during the aircraft’s operation. 
 To provide technical support to the operators for service difficulties and 
mandatory corrective activities. 
Scheduled maintenance is contained in Continuing Airworthiness instructions. 
This work should be accomplished during the type design phase, and 
submitted to the regulatory authority as one of the main supportive documents 
for Type certification.  
4.2 Scheduled Maintenance for Selected Structures 
According to ATA MSG-3 logic, damages to aircraft structures could be caused 
by three damage sources, Accidental Damage (AD), Environmental 
Deterioration (ED), and Fatigue Damage (FD). Damages caused by different 
damage sources should be analyzed separately using different methods and 
logics. 
The input of this analysis was the results from detail design phase of Flying 
Crane in Group Design Project. The results included design detail, selected 
material, damage tolerance data, etc. And the input included the A check and 
C check intervals provided by maintainability designer in Group Design Project 
as well. 
4.2.1 Introduction to Selected Structural Items 
In this part of research, the author selected three structural items, which had 
been designed according to damage-tolerance type during GDP phase. These 
items are fuselage skin panel, fin-fuselage attachment, and wing root joint, 
which were designed respectively by aft fuselage, fin, and inner wing structure 
designers. 
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i. Fuselage skin panel 
According to the results of detail design, the skin thickness was 2.0mm 
between station 19.92m and 23.5m, 1.6mm between 23.5m and 28.5m, and 
1.2mm after 28.05m. The chosen material was 2024-T3 (aluminium alloy with 
copper and magnesium, tempered to ultimate tensile strength of 400-427 
MPa). 
 
Figure 4-1 Aft Fuselage Skin of Flying Crane  
(Jinglin Liu, Cranfield University Group Design Report, 2010) 
ii. Fin-fuselage attachment 
The fin was designed removable to increase the maintainability and 
inspectability. To satisfy the removability, the designer chose to use two bolts 
to fasten the double edge lugs and at spar flanges and one bolt to fasten the 
middle lug (see Figure 4-2). 
The material was Ti-6Al-4V (alpha-beta titanium alloy). 
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Figure 4-2 Fin-Fuselage Attachment of Flying Crane  
(Jinfeng Lv, Cranfield University Group Design Report, 2010) 
iii. Wing root joint 
Wing root joint is considered as one of the most important structural areas, 
especially from the perspective of Continuing Airworthiness.  
The designer chose spliced plates to attach the central and inner wing 
because of its light weight, reliability and inherent fail-safe feature (see Figure 
4-3). 
The material was Ti-6Al-4V (alpha-beta titanium alloy). 
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Figure 4-3 Wing root joint  
(Yifei Liu, Cranfield University Group Design Report, 2010) 
4.2.2 Scheduled Structural Maintenance Development Procedure 
Flying Crane was developed under the philosophy of reliability centred 
maintenance. Therefore, in accordance with EASA Part-M, the maintenance 
instructions for operators should be developed under MSG-3 (Maintenance 
Steering Group) logic. 
In this section, the author will take the three selected structure as examples to 
explain the scheduled structural maintenance development procedure in detail 
with MSG-3 logic (see Figure 4-4). 
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Figure 4-4 MSG-3 logic diagram for structures (ATA, 2003, MSG-3 Logic) 
 
4.2.3 Define aircraft zones or areas (P1) and define aircraft 
structural items (P2) 
As mentioned before, the Author selected three representative structural parts 
from the group design phase of Flying Crane project. They are aft fuselage 
detail design (provided by the designer Ms. Jinglin Liu), fin detail design 
(provided by the designer Mr. Jinfeng Lv), and inner wing detail design 
(provided by the designer Mr. Yifei Liu). 
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The fatigue analysis data and results of these three structures were all 
available. 
4.2.4 Identifying Structural Significant Items (D1) 
First, it’s necessary to identify that, a Structural Significant Item (SSI) is any 
detail, element or assembly, which contributes significantly to carrying flight, 
ground, pressure or control loads, and whose failure could affect the structural 
integrity necessary for the safety of the aircraft. (ATA MSG-3, 2003) 
Fuselage skin panel is one of the most significant elements of an aircraft. With 
its failure, the aerodynamic performance will be totally reversed, and the 
internal components will be easily corroded and contaminated. It has 
significant affect for flight safety. Thus, the fuselage skin panel is considered 
as a Structural Significant Item. 
The fin-fuselage attachments of Flying Crane were identified as structural 
significant item for the following two reasons: 
1) The fin-fuselage attachments need to undertake fore-aft, vertical, and 
shear loads apply on the vertical stabilizer. 
2) The fin of Flying Crane was designed removable to ensure the 
maintainability and detectability. 
With the failure of the attachments, the fin can be totally off the fuselage. 
Wing root joint was also identified as structural significant item, because that, 
without this joint, the wings can be broke and the aeroplane can be out of 
control completely. 
As the selected structures are all structural significant items, the next step 
should be P3, Categorize and list SSI’s. 
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4.2.5 Generating Structural Significant Items List (P3) 
All the three selected structural items were identified as Structural Significant 
Items. The SSI’s list in this research, which can be considered as a segment of 
the SSI’s list of Flying Crane aeroplane, is as follow (Table 4-1). 
Table 4-1 Structural Significant Item List 
Item ID SSI Name Zone Material Category 
01 Fuselage Skin Panel Aft Fuselage Metallic 
02 Fin-fuselage Attachment Fin Metallic 
03 Wing Root Joint Inner Wing Metallic 
 
4.2.6 AD/ED/CPCP Analysis for Metallic Structures (P7 – P9) 
As all selected structures are metallic, the next procedure should be P7 – P9, 
AD/ED/CPCP Analysis (see Figure 4-5). 
In accordance with MSG-3 logic, in this stage, a rating system should be 
utilized to rate each structural significant item in terms of susceptibility and 
detectability due to each damage source. This rating system is supposed to be 
applicable for the assessment of each structural significant item. And rating of 
Accidental Damage, Environmental Deterioration, and Fatigue Damage should 
all be included.  
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Figure 4-5 MSG-3 AD/ED logic diagram - metallic 
(ATA, 2003, MSG-3 Logic) 
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To establish an SSI rating system is a great amount of work by both 
manufacturers and airline operators based on their experience. 
Because of time limitation, and lack of relevant experience data, in this study, 
the author just analyzed the selected structures and listed the AD/ED 
requirements to them.  
Talking about Accidental Damage and Environmental Deterioration, these 
types of damage sources could be understood as damage sources other than 
fatigue damage during airliners’ service life. The main means of damage for 
the selected structures are list in Table 4-2 below. 
Table 4-2 Main Accidental Damage and Environmental Deterioration of 
selected structures 
Fuselage  
skin panel 
Foreign impact, e.g. hail, debris, and birds 
Corrosion, especially corrosion on internal surface 
Failed structures, e.g. fasteners, sealant 
Entrapped water 
Wing root joint 
Loose bolts 
Corrosion 
Fin-fuselage  
attachment 
Loose bolts 
Corrosion 
 
For the fuselage skin panel, physical damage caused by impact could be 
detected by visual check. The check frequency, which should be established 
based on experience data, could vary according to season, climate, air quality, 
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etc. Basically, visual checks on skin panel should be taken every A check at 
least. 
Corrosion on structures is a common problem for each item. For corrosion on 
external surfaces, visual check is applicable. Corrosion on internal surface or 
structures can be found with Non-Destructive Tests such as Infrared 
Inspection and X-ray Inspection. The visual check for corrosion should be 
taken every A check. The inspections where Non-Destructive Tests needed 
are recommended to be taken every four A checks (4A check). 
Rivets and sealant on skin panel can be checked visually. Welds should be 
inspected with NDT. And internal bolts on fin-fuselage attachment and wing 
root joint should be inspected with NDT as well. It is compatible with corrosion 
checks that, visual check should be taken every A check. The inspections 
where NDT needed will be taken every C check. Table 4-3 provides a 
summary of the checks. 
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Table 4-3 AD/ED requirements for selected structures 
Structural 
Item 
Damage Source Check Method 
Check 
Frequency 
Fuselage 
skin panel 
Foreign impact, e.g. hail, 
debris, and birds 
Visual check A check 
Corrosion, especially 
corrosion on internal surface 
Visual check 
(external);   
Eddy current test 
(internal) 
A check 
4A check 
Failed structures, e.g. 
fasteners, sealant 
Visual check 
(rivets, sealant) 
A check 
C check 
Entrapped water 
Infrared 
Inspection 
4A check 
Wing root 
joint 
Loose bolts Visual Check C check 
Corrosion Eddy current test 4A check 
Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Loose bolts Visual Check C check 
Corrosion Eddy current test 4A check 
 
Therefore, the maintenance tasks and intervals for selected structures due to 
Accidental Damage and Environmental Deterioration are shown in Table 4-4 
below. 
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Table 4-4 Structural maintenance tasks and intervals due to AD/ED 
Task ID Task 
Description 
Task Method Task Area Task 
Interval 
01.a.001 Check for 
physical 
damage on 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.a.002 Check for 
corrosion on 
external 
surface of 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.a.003 Check for 
failed rivets 
and sealant 
on skin 
panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
internal 
surface of 
skin panel 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Fuselage skin panel 4A check 
01.4a.002 Check for 
entrapped 
water inside 
skin panel 
Infrared 
Inspection 
Fuselage skin panel 4A check 
03.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
wing root 
joint 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Wing root joint 4A check 
02.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
4A check 
03.c.001 Check for 
loose bolts 
on wing root 
Visual Check Wing root joint C check 
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plates 
02.c.001 Check for 
loose bolts 
on 
fin-fuselage 
attachments 
Visual Check Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
C check 
 
4.2.7 To Determine Damage Tolerant or Safe Life 
In this research, all selected structural items were designed under the 
philosophy of damage tolerant. 
Damage tolerant structures need to be inspected due to possible fatigue 
damage at a certain frequency in accordance with Continuing Airworthiness 
instructions suggested by the manufacturer (refer to Table 4-5).  
For safe life category, the manufacturer will generate safe-life limit which is 
included in the aircraft Airworthiness Limitations. And this field will not be 
contained in this research. 
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Table 4-5 Category as damage tolerant or safe-life 
Structure Design suggested 
interval 
Aircraft service life Category 
Fuselage skin 
panel 
17,872 flights 50,000 flights Damage 
tolerant 
Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
53,511 flight hours 90,000 flight hours Damage 
tolerant 
Wing root joint 92,248 flight hours 90,000 flight hours Damage 
tolerance 
4.2.8 Fatigue Damage Analysis 
All fatigue analysis results from structural detail design phase of Flying Crane 
project were based on damage tolerance philosophy. Visible crack length was 
applied. Thus, the author selected visual check as the method to detect fatigue 
damage (refer to Figure 4-6). 
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Figure 4-6 MSG-3 Fatigue Damage logic diagram (ATA, 2003, MSG-3 
Logic) 
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For fuselage skin panel, the designer suggested inspection interval was 4,468 
flights. Because Flying Crane aircraft is designed aimed at Chinese domestic 
market, the author assumed the average operating duration per flight is three 
hours, which is compatible to the airline between Beijing and Guangzhou, two 
of the biggest cities in domestic China (Official website of Civil Aviation 
Administration of China, 2010). 
Thus, to convert flights to flight hours, the suggested inspection interval of 
fuselage skin panel equals to 4,468 flights multiple 3 hours per flight equals to 
13,404 flight hours. Since the C check interval of Flying Crane is 6,000 flight 
hours, the inspection to fatigue damage on fuselage skin panel should be 
taken every two C checks during operation. 
For the fin-fuselage attachment, the designer suggested inspection interval 
was 17,837 flight hours. Because a safety factor of 4 was applied in the detail 
design phase, it is acceptable to extend the inspection interval to 18,000 flight 
hours, which equals to three C check intervals. 
For the wing root joint, the inspection interval was 92,248 flight hours, which 
already exceeded the length of aircraft service life. So in this research, there 
was no maintenance task related to fatigue damage for wing root joint. Table 
4-6 provides a summary of the maintenance tasks and intervals due to fatigue 
damage. 
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Table 4-6 Structural maintenance tasks and intervals due to Fatigue 
Damage 
Task ID Task 
Description 
Task Method Task Area Task 
Interval 
01.2c.001 Check for 
fatigue 
crack on 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel 2C check 
02.3c.001 Check for 
fatigue 
crack on 
fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Visual Check Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
3C check 
 
4.2.9 Generating Preliminary Scheduled Structural Maintenance  
So far, a preliminary maintenance schedule, which contains structural 
maintenance tasks and intervals, can be generated (Table 4-7). 
It is necessary to clarify that,  
 This preliminary scheduled structural maintenance should be submitted to 
and selected by Structures Working Group (SWG) and proved by Industry 
Steering Committee (ISC), and then included in the Maintenance Review 
Board (MRB) report proposal. 
 It is supposed to be more detail information such as inspection instructions, 
required qualification, etc. This range of information should be provided by 
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design department, maintenance department, and quality department of 
the manufacturer in the real life. 
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Table 4-7 Scheduled Maintenance for Selected Structures 
Task ID Task 
Description 
Task Method Task Area Task 
Interval 
01.a.001 Check for 
physical 
damage on 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.a.002 Check for 
corrosion on 
external 
surface of 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.a.003 Check for 
failed rivets 
and sealant 
on skin 
panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
internal 
surface of 
skin panel 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Fuselage skin panel 4A check 
01.4a.002 Check for 
entrapped 
water inside 
skin panel 
Infrared 
Inspection 
Fuselage skin panel 4A check 
03.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
wing root 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Wing root joint 4A check 
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joint 
02.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
4A check 
03.c.001 Check for 
loose bolts 
on wing root 
plates 
Visual Check Wing root joint C check 
02.c.001 Check for 
loose bolts 
on 
fin-fuselage 
attachments 
Visual Check Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
C check 
01.2c.001 Check for 
fatigue 
crack on 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel 2C check 
02.3c.001 Check for 
fatigue 
crack on 
fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Visual Check Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
3C check 
4.3 Scheduled Maintenance for Selected System 
In MSG-3 logic, airframe system analysis needs more supportive data from 
system designers and reliability department than structures. 
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For each item under analysis, the following must be identified in advance: 
functions, functional failures, failure effects, and failure causes. 
For this reason, in this study, the author selected fuel system as the example 
to implement MSG-3 system analysis because of the availability of such 
necessary data. 
4.3.1 Introduction to Fuel System 
The fuel system of Flying Crane was developed by Mr Zhaoang Meng during 
the detail design phase. It has four main sub-systems, which are engine/APU 
feed system, refuel/defuel system, vent/scavenge system, and fuel 
management system.  
Inside each wing, there are three fuel tanks, which are inner tank, outer tank 
and surge tank. Among them, inner tanks and outer tanks are fuel tanks 
providing fuel directly to the engine and APU. And surge tanks are 
pressurization tanks, which is used to keep balance of the aircraft. (Zhaoang 
Meng, Cranfield University Group Design Report, 2010) 
The necessary input of this section, functions, functional failures, failure effects, 
and failure causes, was delivered in the means of Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), which was developed with the assist from maintainability 
designer, Mr Wangfeng Yang (seen in Figure 4-7). 
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Figure 4-7 Flying Crane fuel system structure  
(Wangfeng Yang, Cranfield University Group Design Report, 2010) 
 
Due to the limitation on space, the author took partial of the FMEA analysis 
form as example to explain the system maintenance development procedure. 
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Table 4-8 A Section of FMEA Analysis Form (Wangfeng Yang, Cranfield University Group Design Report, 2010) 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - Flying Crane 
System :   fuel system（28）       
Subsystem: engine/APU feed system（28.10） 
Date source:  
Analyst: WY and Z M               Date: 21-6-2010 
Item  
Number 
Item 
Description 
Function 
description 
Failure Mode  
ID 
Failure Mode  Failure cause Local  
Effect 
Next Higher 
Effects 
End Effects Sev. Detection 
Method 
Compensating 
Provisions 
Remarks 
28.10.01 
 
AC boost 
pump 
 
supply engine 
with fuel from 
tank under 
the specific 
pressure and 
flow 
 
FM-01 
 
Loss function 
of delivering 
fuel 
  motor  
failure 
Other 
pumps 
workload 
increase 
fail to provide 
fuel to engine 
Loss 
thrust 
Ⅱ Sensor Warning  Backup 
Jam because 
of 
contaminatio
n 
Other 
pumps 
workload 
increase 
fail to provide 
fuel to engine 
Loss 
thrust 
Ⅱ Sensor Warning measure fuel 
pollution 
Regularly 
FM-02 
 
provide fuel 
with low 
pressure 
and/or flow 
wear or 
corrosion 
Other 
pumps 
workload 
increase 
provide un 
sufficient 
fuel to engine 
the 
thrust 
decreased  
Ⅱ NO Warning Preventive 
inspection 
28.10.02 
 
DC APU 
pump 
supply fuel to 
APU under 
the specific 
pressure and 
flow 
FM-01 
 
fail to deliver 
fuel 
motor  
failure 
Other 
pumps 
workload 
increase 
APU fails to 
work(on 
ground) 
Fail to star 
engine 
Ⅴ Sensor Use the ground 
electrical power 
unit 
Backup 
APU fails to 
work(in flight) 
failed to 
provide 
electrical 
power to 
Ⅰ Sensor Warning  measure fuel 
pollution 
Regularly 
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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - Flying Crane 
System :   fuel system（28）       
Subsystem: engine/APU feed system（28.10） 
Date source:  
Analyst: WY and Z M               Date: 21-6-2010 
Item  
Number 
Item 
Description 
Function 
description 
Failure Mode  
ID 
Failure Mode  Failure cause Local  
Effect 
Next Higher 
Effects 
End Effects Sev. Detection 
Method 
Compensating 
Provisions 
Remarks 
aircraft 
Jam because 
of 
contaminatio
n 
Other 
pumps 
workload 
increase 
APU fails to 
work(on 
ground) 
Fail to star 
engine 
Ⅴ Sensor Use the ground 
electrical power 
unit 
Backup 
N/A APU fails to 
work(in flight) 
failed to 
provide 
electrical 
power to 
aircraft 
Ⅰ Sensor Warning  measure fuel 
pollution 
Regularly 
 the Main  
Generation  
Assembly 
check  
valve 
Permits 
fluid flow  
through 
the  
 FM-02 
 
provide fuel 
with low 
pressure 
wear or 
corrosion 
N/A provide 
insufficient 
fuel to APU 
(on ground) 
Fail to star 
engine 
Ⅴ Sensor Use the ground 
electrical power 
unit 
Backup 
N/A provide 
insufficient 
fuel to APU  
(in flight) 
APU function 
descend/no 
enough 
electrical 
power 
Ⅰ Sensor Warning/decre
ase the power 
load 
measure fuel 
pollution 
Regularly 
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4.3.2 Maintenance Significant Items Selection 
Before the MSG-3 logic applied on system items, Maintenance Significant 
Items (MSI) should be identified. 
To select maintenance significant items, the whole aircraft, as well as each 
system and sub-system, should be divided into major functional areas, until all 
replaceable items identified.  
And then, those items would be judged from four aspects, which are 
detectability, safety affect, operational impact, and economic impact. Because 
fuel system is an airframe system closely related to flight safety and economy, 
all listed items were identified as Maintenance Significant Items. 
At last, the candidate MSI list needs to be submitted to and get approval from 
Industry Steering Committee in the real industry. 
This part of work was done in GDP phase and partly shown in table 4-9 
Table 4-9 Failure Effect Category of Selected Maintenance Significant 
Items 
Maintenance 
Significant Item 
Functional failure Failure 
effect 
category 
AC boost pump Loss function of delivering fuel 5 
AC boost pump provide fuel with low pressure and/or flow 5 
DC APU pump fail to deliver fuel (on ground) 6 
DC APU pump fail to deliver fuel (in flight) 5 
DC APU pump provide fuel with low pressure (on ground) 6 
DC APU pump provide fuel with low pressure (in flight) 5 
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4.3.3 Analysis Procedure 
To prepare for the actual analysis procedure, for each Maintenance Significant 
Item, the functions, functional failures, failure effects, and failure causes should 
be identified clearly. 
Generally, this range of information can be delivered within Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA). 
Table 4-8 was a really practical style of FMEA. It listed every potential 
functional failure for each function, and clearly identified each functional 
failure’s effects on three levels, which will be quite helpful and convenient in 
the analysis procedure.  
The analysis itself has two levels. Level 1 is to categorize each functional 
failure by their failure effects. And level 2 is to determine what task applicable 
for each functional failure. 
4.3.4 Category of Failure Effects (First Level) 
In the following paragraphs, the author will analyse each item in table 4-8 
through MSG-3 logic (see Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9). 
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Figure 4-8 Level 1 System Logic - Part 1 of 2 (ATA, 2003, MSG-3 Logic) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Level 1 System Logic - Part 2 of 2 (ATA, 2003, MSG-3 Logic) 
 
Maintenance Significant Item: 28.10.01, AC boost pump 
Functional failure: FM-01, Loss function of delivering fuel 
The answer to question 1 is YES. Because there will be indicators to warn the 
crew when this functional failure happens. Now turn to question 2. 
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The answer to question 2 is YES. Loss of fuel delivery will lead to loss of 
engine thrust. And the severity of this functional failure is II, hazardous, which 
means large adverse effects will be committed. 
Thus, the functional failure, “loss function of delivering fuel”, was categorized 
as Category 5, “Safety Effects”. 
Functional failure: FM-02, provide fuel with low pressure and/or flow 
With the same analysis routine, this functional failure was categorized as 
Category 5, “Safety Effects”. 
Maintenance Significant Item: 28.10.02, DC APU pump 
Functional failure: FM-01, fail to deliver fuel 
When this failure happens on ground, it is evident to the crew. It has no 
adverse effect on safety, but adverse effect on operating capability. So it is 
categorized as Category 6, “Operational Effects”. 
Quite differently, when this failure happens in flight, although it is still evident to 
the crew, it has great adverse effects on safety because of lacking electrical 
power provided. So it is categorized as Category 5, “Safety Effects”. 
Functional failure: FM-02, provide fuel with low pressure 
Compatible with FM-01, two situations should be considered. 
When this failure happens on ground, it is evident to the crew. And it has no 
adverse effect on safety, but adverse effect on operating capability. So it is 
categorized as Category 6, “Operational Effects”. 
When this failure happens in flight, although it is still evident to the crew, it has 
great adverse effects on safety because of lacking electrical power provided. 
So it is categorized as Category 5, “Safety Effects”. 
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4.3.5 Tasks Development (Category 5, Second Level) 
 
The category 5 is functional failures which have evident safety effects. For 
those functional failures related to safety, all questions should be asked. 
The functional failure of loss function of delivering fuel, AC boost pump was 
taken as example. 
This functional failure has two possible causes, which are motor failure and 
contamination jam.  
Refer to Figure 4-10, Question 5A: YES. For motor failure, scheduled 
lubrication and servicing would be helpful to maintain the motor at a good 
working condition. For contamination jam, a clearance for all related fuel tubing 
will help reduce the risk of this functional failure. 
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Figure 4-10 Functional Failures Categorized as Evident Safety Effects 
(ATA, 2003, MSG-3 Logic) 
Proposed tasks:  
i. Pump motor servicing 
ii. Fuel tubing cleaning 
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Question 5B: YES. Figure 4-11, which is called P-F curve, demonstrates what 
happens in an item’s service life. It is a widely accepted concept in 
reliability-centred maintenance. As shown in P-F curve, a functional failure 
happens at point F, and it had been detectable since point P. So in the period 
between point P and F, the potential failure can be found out by an inspection 
or functional check. 
Proposed tasks: 
iii. Functional check the AC boost pump 
 
Figure 4-11 The P-F curve (John Moubray, 1997) 
Question 5C: YES. For finished products such as AC boost pump, it is 
necessary to uninstall them after a certain period of usage and send them back 
to the work shop to restore them into a high working condition. 
Proposed tasks: 
iv. Alternate AC boost pumps for restoration 
Question 5D: YES. After a long period of usage, there will be unrecoverable 
internal wear within the pump. So in this condition, a discard is needed. 
Proposed tasks: 
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v. Discard the AC boost pump 
Question 5E: YES. In this step, as this is a category related to safety, every 
task should be taken unless it is totally covered by another, or several of them 
can be combined into one with all original purpose. Among the tasks proposed 
above, the fifth task, discard the AC boost pump, can be combined with the 
forth task, alternate AC boost pumps for restoration. Because when the pumps 
back to the work shop, the supplier would determine its availability. If a discard 
is needed, it will happen together with restoration works. So there’s no need to 
discard the pump when maintaining the system.  
The same procedure was applied on the other three functional failures which 
categorized as evident safety effects. Table 4-10 shows the proposed 
maintenance tasks. 
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Table 4-10 Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Category 5 Functional 
Failures 
Maintenance 
Significant 
Item 
Task Description System 
AC boost pump Servicing AC boost pump motor Fuel system 
AC boost pump Cleaning tubing connected to AC boost pump Fuel system 
AC boost pump Test AC boost pump fuel supply pressure Fuel system 
AC boost pump Functional check the AC boost pump Fuel system 
AC boost pump Alternate AC boost pumps for restoration Fuel system 
DC APU pump Servicing DC APU pump motor Fuel system 
DC APU pump Cleaning tubing connected to DC APU pump Fuel system 
DC APU pump Test DC APU pump fuel supply pressure Fuel system 
DC APU pump Functional check the DC APU pump Fuel system 
DC APU pump Alternate DC APU pump for restoration Fuel system 
 
4.3.6 Tasks Development (Category 6, Second Level) 
The category 6 is functional failures which have evident operational effects. 
The author took the failure of fail to deliver fuel (on ground), DC APU pump as 
example to implement the level two analysis procedure for Category 6 system 
items. Because this procedure was quite similar with Category 5, the author 
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described the part which is different than the Evident Safety Effect category 
(see Figure 4-12). 
 
Figure 4-12 Functional Failures Categorized as Evident Operational 
Effects (ATA, 2003, MSG-3 Logic) 
There are two possible causes of this functional failure, which are motor failure 
and contamination jam. 
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The most significant different between the analysis procedures of Evident 
Operational Effects category and Evident Safety Effects category is that, in 
Category 6, it is not necessary to go through the whole procedure every time.  
For example, for the functional failure of “fail to deliver fuel (on ground)”, the 
answer to question 6B is YES. Then it comes to “inspection or functional 
check”, which is the end of this procedure.  
It is because that, these kind of functional failures has no relationship with flight 
safety. From airworthiness point of view, it is acceptable to take 
Condition-based Maintain, which means maintenance performed after their 
occurrence. 
Thus, the proposed tasks for this failure are shown in Table 4-11. 
Table 4-11 Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Category 6 Functional 
Failures 
Maintenance 
Significant Item 
Task Description System 
DC APU pump Servicing DC APU pump motor Fuel system 
DC APU pump Cleaning tubing connected to DC APU pump Fuel system 
DC APU pump Test DC APU pump fuel supply pressure Fuel system 
DC APU pump Functional check the DC APU pump Fuel system 
 
4.3.7 System Maintenance Task Intervals Development 
In the realistic industry, for a new designed aircraft, it is almost impossible to 
establish the “right” interval for maintenance tasks, because of the lack of 
specific data of functional failure rates and characteristics. 
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Basically, in the type design and certificate phase, intervals for system 
maintenance tasks are developed based on service experiences data 
collected from comparative systems, components, and aircrafts. 
From Continuing Airworthiness’ perspective, for the consideration of flight 
safety, the recommendation of “shorten the initial interval, then extend it 
gradually” will be given to the manufacturers and maintenance organizations, 
especially relevant experience data is inaccessible. 
There are three main methods to determine maintenance task intervals in 
nowadays aviation industry. 
For finished products such as pumps and valves in fuel system, the suggested 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) should be provided by product suppliers 
to help determine maintenance task intervals. 
Another method to determine maintenance interval is manufacturer’s 
experiment and engineering analysis. And relative record and data should be 
submitted to the competent authority together with the results. 
The third method is make development based on experience data from similar 
aircraft types in service. But, even for one single aircraft, the maintenance 
programme could vary dramatically from different periods in its service life. For 
one single type, different airlines could have quite different maintenance plans 
due to different maintenance ability and operational circumstances. 
For the reasons described above, the author did not make the predictive 
maintenance intervals for airframe systems. The author hopes in the future 
research in this field, there could be an individual research topic, which is to 
determine system maintenance intervals with reliability-centred maintenance 
theory. 
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4.4 Continuing Airworthiness Instructions 
The scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for systems and structures is 
contained in the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR). MRBR is one of 
the documents related to Continuing Airworthiness, submitted by type design 
organizations and proved by regulatory authorities like EASA. 
Other than MRBR, these documents include Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM), 
Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI), Certification Maintenance Requirement 
(CMR), and Main Minimum Equipment List (MMEL). 
This collection of documents is defined as Continuing Airworthiness 
Instructions for type certification. 
4.4.1 Organizations of Continuing Airworthiness instructions 
Development 
In the realistic industry, any of Continuing Airworthiness instructions is not 
developed or determined by any single organization. They can be checked and 
revised times and times by different types of organizations assembled to 
control and support the development procedure. 
Taking the maintenance schedule as example, all maintenance tasks and 
intervals should be developed in associate with the Industry Steering 
Committee (ISC) and Maintenance Working Group (MWG). 
The members of ISC include representative from manufacturer and operators. 
This organization is considered as the leader or guide for maintenance 
development procedure. It accounts for work related to policy, management, 
plan, final approval, and contact with regulatory authority. 
On the other hand, the MWG’s, which consists of specialist representatives 
from operators, manufacture, and regulatory authority, are much more like 
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supportive organizations providing supportive information such as technical 
data, experiential recommendations, engineering analysis, which shall be 
contained into the final report presented to regulatory authority. 
4.4.2 Proposed Continuing Airworthiness Instructions of Flying 
Crane 
As an initial form of a part of Continuing Airworthiness instructions, the 
scheduled maintenance developed by the author includes proposed predictive 
maintenance tasks and intervals for three structural items (fuselage skin panel, 
fin-fuselage attachment, and wing root joint) and one airframe system 
(propulsion and fuel system) based on design data of Flying Crane project, 
which is the Group Design Project of Aircraft Design Programme in academic 
year 2010 (see Table 4-12). 
Due to the limitation on time and space, lack of experiential data sources, and 
limited results from detailed design phase, the author were not able to make 
this research into a very specific level. Therefore, in the sixth chapter, the 
author gave his own suggestion to future study. 
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Table 4-12 Proposed Maintenance Schedule for Structures and Systems 
of Flying Crane 
Task ID Task 
Description 
Task Method Task Area Task 
Interval 
01.a.001 Check for 
physical 
damage on 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.a.002 Check for 
corrosion on 
external 
surface of 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.a.003 Check for 
failed rivets 
and sealant 
on skin 
panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel A check 
01.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
internal 
surface of 
skin panel 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Fuselage skin panel 4A check 
01.4a.002 Check for 
entrapped 
water inside 
skin panel 
Infrared 
Inspection 
Fuselage skin panel 4A check 
03.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Wing root joint 4A check 
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wing root 
joint 
02.4a.001 Check for 
corrosion on 
fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Eddy Current 
Test 
Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
4A check 
03.c.001 Check for 
loose bolts 
on wing root 
plates 
Visual Check Wing root joint C check 
02.c.001 Check for 
loose bolts 
on 
fin-fuselage 
attachments 
Visual Check Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
C check 
01.2c.001 Check for 
fatigue 
crack on 
skin panel 
Visual Check Fuselage skin panel 2C check 
02.3c.001 Check for 
fatigue 
crack on 
fin-fuselage 
attachment 
Visual Check Fin-fuselage 
attachment 
3C check 
     
28.10.001 Servicing 
AC boost 
pump motor 
Lubrication/ 
Serving 
Fuel System TBD 
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28.10.002 Cleaning 
tubing 
connected 
to AC boost 
pump 
Lubrication/ 
Serving 
Fuel System TBD 
28.10.003 Test AC 
boost pump 
fuel supply 
pressure 
Inspection/ 
Functional 
Check 
Fuel system TBD 
28.10.004 Functional 
check the 
AC boost 
pump 
Inspection/ 
Functional 
Check 
Fuel system TBD 
28.10.005 Alternate 
AC boost 
pumps for 
restoration 
Restoration Fuel system TBD 
28.10.006 Servicing 
DC APU 
pump motor 
Lubrication/ 
Serving 
Fuel system TBD 
28.10.007 Cleaning 
tubing 
connected 
to DC APU 
pump 
Lubrication/ 
Serving 
Fuel system TBD 
28.10.008 Test DC 
APU pump 
fuel supply 
pressure 
Inspection/ 
Functional 
Check 
Fuel system TBD 
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28.10.009 Functional 
check the 
DC APU 
pump 
Inspection/ 
Functional 
Check 
Fuel system TBD 
28.10.010 Alternate 
DC APU 
pump for 
restoration 
Restoration Fuel system TBD 
Notes:  A check = 600 Flight Hours 
C check = 20 Months or 6,000 Flight Hours 
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5 Selection of Chinese Maintenance Organizations 
As the target market of Flying Crane aircraft is Mainland China, the Flying 
Crane was supposed to be operated by Chinese domestic airline companies. 
And the Continuing Airworthiness of Flying Crane was supposed to be 
maintained by qualified Chinese domestic aircraft maintenance organizations 
as well. 
In this chapter, the author introduced the responsibilities of maintenance 
organizations, and the criteria to select maintenance organizations for Flying 
Crane aircraft. 
5.1 The Role of Maintenance Organizations 
A qualified and certified Maintenance Organization is supposed to have 
adequate capability and correct qualification to maintain aircrafts and aircraft 
components in accordance with Continuing Airworthiness instructions from the 
manufacturer. 
The business scope of maintenance organizations includes inspection, repair, 
modification, overhaul, line maintenance, and other maintenance tasks 
required by operators and authorized by competent authority (see Figure 5-1). 
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Figure 5-1 the Role of Maintenance Organization in Continuing 
Airworthiness 
Other than the three basic roles, the Regulator, the TC Holder, and the 
Operator, Maintenance Organization is not legally indispensible in the world of 
Continuing Airworthiness. 
However, in the realistic civil aviation industry, it is neither economic nor 
technically feasible for airline companies to undertake all maintenance work 
during aircraft operation life. Thus, for most civil aircraft operators, to 
cooperate with specific aircraft maintenance enterprise is the solution. 
Basically, from the perspective of airworthiness management, maintenance 
organization is a unit sharing tasks related to maintenance with aircraft 
operator. And it has the same responsibility of implementing airworthiness 
directives from Regulatory Authority and exchanging information with 
manufacturer as well. 
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The responsibilities of maintenance organization include: 
 To strictly follow every certified maintenance programme issued by 
operator and manufacturer; 
 To implement every airworthiness directive issued by Regulatory Authority; 
 To record any inaccuracy, deficiency, and redundancy of maintenance 
programme discovered during practical operations, and give feedback to 
the operator and manufacturer; 
5.2 Selection Criteria 
5.2.1 Maintenance Approval Class and Rating 
According to Part-145, the scope of organization’s work is defined and 
classified by the approval classes and ratings granted by competent authority. 
The scope declines from Category A to Category D. Meanwhile, Category A is 
partitioned into Base and Line maintenance. 
For instance, the 4C check for fuselage and engine overhaul have to be 
undertaken in maintenance organizations with Category A classes and ratings. 
But for A check, a Category C is applicable. 
5.2.2 Hangar Capacity 
Larger hangar capacity assures higher efficiency during parallel processing. 
But the demand of large hangar capacity depends on the fleet size of the 
specific operator. 
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5.2.3 Market Performance and Experience 
Market is a good tool to measure the capability of an enterprise. So it is 
significant to choose maintenance organizations with comparatively higher 
market share. 
In addition, different types of aircrafts have different structure characteristic, 
system layout, and engine size. So the experience of maintaining aircrafts on 
the comparative level with Flying Crane (e.g. Boeing 737 and Airbus A320) is 
another important factor. 
5.2.4 Technical Requirements 
In the maintenance plan proposed in Chapter 4, the scheduled maintenance 
had contained A check, 4A check, C check, 2C check, and 3C check. Due to 
different maintenance intervals, the according maintenance tasks had different 
technical requirements. From economic and operational perspective, 
maintenance organizations with different technical level should be selected for 
different maintenance tasks. 
5.2.5 Accessibility 
For shorter interval checks, such as A Checks, the location of the selected 
maintenance organization should not be far from most often used airport. 
5.3 Selecting Maintenance Organizations in China 
Even during 2007 and 2008, in which the global financial crisis went the most 
seriously, a rapid increase was remained in civil aviation market of China. 
Along with the development of civil aviation, the aviation maintenance industry 
is experiencing a fast growth as well. 
In Chapter 4, the author developed a series of scheduled maintenance tasks in 
different check intervals. In the following paragraphs, the author would 
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recommend one Chinese maintenance organization for each maintenance 
type, based on the scheduled maintenance (Table 5-1), and in accordance 
with the criteria set in Section 5.2. 
Table 5-1 Technical Requirements for Maintenance tasks at Different 
Interval 
Interval Task 
A Check Visual Check for corrosion and physical damage 
4A or C Check Eddy Current Test; Infrared Inspection; X-ray Inspection 
2C or 3C Check 
(overhauls) 
Visual Check (de-painting required); Visual Check 
(large component removal required) 
 
Within the author’s investigate to aircraft maintenance companies in Mainland 
China, the top four of them were taken under consideration.  
According to the selection criteria established in section 5.2, the candidate 
companies were analyzed and rated in the following Table 5-2.  
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Table 5-2 Maintenance Organization Selection Matrix 
  
TAECO 
Taikoo (Xiamen) Aircraft 
Engineering Company, 
Limited 
GAMECO 
Guangzhou Aircraft 
Maintenance Engineering 
Co. Ltd 
AMECO 
Aircraft Maintenance and 
Engineering Corporation 
STAECO 
Shandong Taikoo Aircraft 
Engineering Company, 
Limited 
Score Description Score Description Score Description Score Description 
Maintenance 
Approval 
Class and 
Rating 
7 
Category A 
overhaul for 
Boeing 
737/747/757/767, 
Airbus A330/340; 
Modification, 
Avionics Update, 
and Fuselage 
De-painting for 
Boeing 
747-200/300/400 
and MD11 
9 
Category A. 
A/B/C/D Check 
for Boeing 
737/747/757/76
7/777, Airbus 
A319/320/321/3
00/330, and 
EMB145 
8 
up to Category 
A check of 
Boeing 
737/747/757/7
67 and Airbus 
A320/330/340 
8 
Boeing 737 
Classic A, C, D 
check; Boeing 
737 Next 
Generation all 
check; Airbus 
A319/A320/A321 
up to C check; 
Bombardier 
CRJ200/700 all 
check 
Hangar 
Capacity 
10 
10 wide-body 
airliners and 5 
narrow-body 
airliners 
6 
4 wide-body 
airliners or 12 
narrow-body 
airliners 
6 
12 
narrow-body 
airliners 
4 
10 narrow-body 
airliners 
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TAECO 
Taikoo (Xiamen) Aircraft 
Engineering Company, 
Limited 
GAMECO 
Guangzhou Aircraft 
Maintenance Engineering 
Co. Ltd 
AMECO 
Aircraft Maintenance and 
Engineering Corporation 
STAECO 
Shandong Taikoo Aircraft 
Engineering Company, 
Limited 
Score Description Score Description Score Description Score Description 
Market 
Performance 
and 
Experience 
7 
focused on large 
airliner 
maintenance, 
relatively lack of 
experience about 
narrow body 
aircraft 
maintenance  
7 
experienced in 
maintaining 
narrow-body 
airliners 
9 
experienced in 
maintaining 
narrow-body 
airliners 
5 
experience in 
maintaining 
narrow-body 
airliners only 
Technical 
Requirements 
10 
All requirements 
satisfied 
10 
All requirements 
satisfied 
10 
All 
requirements 
satisfied 
10 
All requirements 
satisfied 
Accessibility 7 
Located in Xiamen 
City, Fujian 
Province, which is 
on the coast of 
Southeast China 
10 
Located in 
Guangzhou 
City, 
Guangdong 
Province, South 
China 
10 
Located in 
Beijing, the 
Capital of 
China 
5 
Located in Jinan, 
Shandong, 
Mid-east China 
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TAECO 
Taikoo (Xiamen) Aircraft 
Engineering Company, 
Limited 
GAMECO 
Guangzhou Aircraft 
Maintenance Engineering 
Co. Ltd 
AMECO 
Aircraft Maintenance and 
Engineering Corporation 
STAECO 
Shandong Taikoo Aircraft 
Engineering Company, 
Limited 
Score Description Score Description Score Description Score Description 
Overall 41   42   43   32   
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Refer to the overall ratings, STAECO got the lowest score 32, which suggested 
that it did not obtain enough advantages compared with other candidate 
companies within this assessment rules. 
The other three companies got almost the same score, which indicated that 
they all satisfied the maintenance demands of Flying Crane.  
Based on their own advantages, they were designated respectively as 
maintenance organizations for overhauls, mid-term maintenance and 
short-term maintenance for the following reasons. 
 For maintenance organization for overhauls, large hangar capacity is 
necessary to ensure parallel working in order to keep process delay and 
time costs at a relatively low level.  
 For maintenance organization for short-term maintenance, quickness and 
efficiency are priorities to be concerned. So the company located at the 
position with the highest accessibility was selected. 
 For mid-term maintenance, both of above two points have to be 
considered, and the choice of the company with the richest experience 
with narrow-body airline maintenance ensured that potential significant 
failures could be discovered at a relatively high possibility. 
The following is further information concerning the selected maintenance 
organizations. 
i. Maintenance Organization for Overhauls 
Organization: Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Company, Limited (TAECO) 
Organization Introduction: Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co. Ltd (TAECO), which 
is located in Xiamen City, Fujian Province (Southeast China), was initially 
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launched in 1993. It has become one of the largest and most professional 
aircraft maintenance centre in the world. 
Approval Class and Rating: Category A overhaul for Boeing 737/747/757/767, 
Airbus A330/340; Modification, Avionics Update, and Fuselage De-painting for 
Boeing 747-200/300/400 and MD11. 
Hangar Capacity: simultaneously 10 wide-body airliners and 5 narrow-body 
airliners 
(TAECO, 2010) 
Advantages: the largest hangar capacity in China; high technical level. 
Disadvantages: comparatively lack of experienced in narrow-body aircraft 
maintenance, 
ii. Maintenance Organization for Mid-term Maintenance 
Organization: Guangzhou Aircraft Maintenance Engineering Co. Ltd 
(GAMECO) 
Organization Introduction: GAMECO is located in Guangzhou City, 
Guangdong Province (South China), firstly launched in 1989. Its main 
customer, China Southern Airline, is the biggest airline company in China 
Approval Class and Rating: Category A. A/B/C/D Check for Boeing 
737/747/757/767/777, Airbus A319/320/321/300/330, and EMB145 
Hangar Capacity: simultaneously 4 wide-body airliners or 12 narrow-body 
airliners 
(GAMECO, 2010) 
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Advantages: Largest Hangar other than TAECO; experienced in maintaining 
narrow-body airliners;  
iii. Maintenance Organization for Short-term Maintenance 
Organization: Aircraft Maintenance and Engineering Corporation (AMECO) 
Organization Introduction: AMECO is located in Beijing, China, firstly launched 
in 1989, based on the Capital International Airfield of Beijing.  
Approval class and rating: up to Category A check of Boeing 737/747/757/767 
and Airbus A320/330/340  
Hangar Capacity: simultaneously 12 narrow-body airliners 
(AMECO, 2010) 
Advantages: experienced in maintaining narrow-body airliners 
 
  
 95 
6 Conclusion and Further Work 
This is a research into Continuing Airworthiness from the perspective of a TC 
Holder (manufacturer), based on the detailed design of Flying Crane aircrafts.  
6.1 Research Findings 
In this research, two aspects of Continuing Airworthiness were investigated, 
including maintenance programme and maintenance organization. 
For maintenance programme, the author selected the MSG-3 logic, which is 
the most accepted and widely used method to plan scheduled maintenance 
during aircraft Type design phase. 
With MSG-3 logic, the author developed the maintenance plan for three 
structural components (fuselage skin panel, wing root joint, and fin-fuselage 
attachment) and one airframe system (fuel system) based on results from the 
Group Design Project in academic year 2010-2011. 
For maintenance organization, the author investigated the Chinese domestic 
aircraft maintenance market, and selected applicable maintenance 
organizations technically and economically. 
Within the research, the following findings have been achieved: 
 In MSG-3 logic, the ultimate aim is to ensure flight safety, whilst both 
technology and economy are under consideration. And the key to 
Continuing Airworthiness is to balance the technology and economy as 
well. 
 The technical basis of MSG-3 analysis is Reliability-centred Maintenance 
and Damage Tolerance, which related to airframe system maintenance 
and structure maintenance respectively. 
 96 
 Experience, including design experience, operational experience, 
maintenance experience, plays a role no less importance than calculation 
and analysis. Because the preliminary maintenance plan is proposed on 
the basis of service experience, and approved by ISC (Industry Steering 
Committee), which consists of a group of experienced specialist from 
manufacturers, operators, and Regulatory Authority. 
 MSG-3 logic is mainly focused on components with high level of 
importance. As in both system and structure analysis, to identify 
Maintenance/Structural Significant Items is the very first step. 
 Maintenance programmes vary from operator to operator, fleet to fleet, 
aircraft to aircraft. Even one single aircraft could have different 
maintenance programme due to different service years. Thus, the 
maintenance plan developed by manufacture is just a proposal. The 
specific operators should build their own maintenance programmes due to 
the one proposed by manufacturers. 
 Compared with other types of system safety analysis, FMEA (Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis) is the most applicable as the input of MSG-3 system 
analysis. Because it contains all of the Function, Functional Failure, Failure 
Cause, and Failure Effect of a system or sub-system. 
 The interval of maintenance task against functional failure can be resulted 
from MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures). In addition, the inherent MTBF 
of a system could be calculated by designer, and MTBF for procured 
products should be provided by the supplier. 
 For a new type of aircraft, the initially proposed intervals of maintenance 
tasks are recommended to be comparatively shorter. The interval could be 
extended along with the increased service period. 
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6.2 Aim and Objectives Achieved 
As set at the beginning of this research, the aim of research was to prove one 
means of compliance to satisfy the EASA requirements related to Continuing 
Airworthiness by applying the airworthiness requirements and the 
methodology of MSG-3 logic on Flying Crane. 
The author believes the aim of research has been achieved by the 
achievement of the objectives as following: 
 Objective: To investigate current Continuing Airworthiness regulations, 
including EASA airworthiness requirements (as the main regulation to 
comply with) and Chinese CCAR airworthiness regulations (as an 
important reference and supplement to the research) 
 Achievement: Achieved. The author did investigate EASA requirements 
and CCAR regulations related to Continuing Airworthiness, and made 
comparison between those regulations. In addition, EASA requirements 
were applied along the whole research process. 
 Objective: To investigate the main analysis methodology of reliability and 
maintainability, including Damage Tolerance and Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA); 
 Achievement: Achieved. With the procedure of structure and system 
maintenance development, the results of both Damage Tolerance and 
FMEA were applied to MSG-3 logic. 
 Objective: To analyze the data resulted from Group Design Project using 
MSG-3 logic to produce a set of Continuing Airworthiness instructions, for 
the operator and maintenance organization of the aircraft, from the design 
organization’s perspective; 
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 Achievement: Mostly Achieved. At the beginning of this research, three 
airframe systems and three structural items were planned to be analyzed 
with MSG-3 logic and resulted in Continuing Airworthiness instructions. But 
at present, there is only one system analyzed. The reason was that, the 
author was not able to realize the practical differences between different 
types of reliability tools such as Faulty Tree Assessment and FMEA. 
During the process of research, only FMEA delivered sufficient information 
for MSG-3 analysis. And due to the time limitation, only the fuel system, 
which contained a complete FMEA analysis form, was analyzed. 
 Objective: To develop Continuing Airworthiness instructions for operator to 
compose maintenance programme for Flying Crane aircraft, including 
maintenance tasks and intervals for the selected airframe systems and 
structural components; 
 Achievement: Mostly Achieved. But for the same reason with the previous 
objective, the proposed maintenance programme was not as much as 
initially supposed. 
 To identify applicable maintenance organizations in China mainland for 
Flying Crane aircraft in accordance with both EASA and CCAR 
requirements. 
 Achievement: Achieved. Three of Chinese domestic aircraft maintenance 
organizations were identified due to different maintenance types.  
6.3 Limitation of MSG-3 Logic 
As previously mentioned, experience, including design experience, operational 
experience, maintenance experience, plays an extremely important role during 
the MSG-3 logic.  
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In the reality of industrial applications, the preliminary maintenance plan is 
approved by ISC based on their industrial experience, and certified by 
specialist employed by competent authority based on their experience as well. 
That means the maintenance plan is largely proposed from experience, 
approved from experience, and certified from experience.  
Indeed, this is actually reasonable because of the unpredictability of failure and 
damage. However, in this situation, it is really impracticable for theoretical 
research. 
6.4 Recommendation for Further Work 
6.4.1 Required Data to Implement MSG-3 Logic 
Thanks to the effects of GDP teams, in this research, most of the required data 
for MSG-3 logic was available by the end of GDP phase. The available data 
includes: 
 FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) of selected system; 
 Damage Tolerance analysis results of selected structures (Design life and 
suggested inspection intervals); and 
 Intervals of A Check and C Check 
In addition, in the future research related to Continuing Airworthiness and 
scheduled maintenance, it will be really helpful with the provision of the 
following data: 
 MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure) of the same system with FMEA 
available; and 
 Statistical data of Accidental Damage and Environmental Deterioration on 
selected structures. 
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6.4.2 Further Research Related to MSG-3 
As previously discussed, due to limitation of theoretical research, further 
research focused on MSG-3 logic itself might be impracticable or meaningless. 
However, inspirited from this research, the author recommended two areas of 
further research related to MSG-3: 
i. The Rating System for Structures 
During MSG-3 structure analysis, to identify the maintenance tasks and 
intervals due to Accidental Damage and Environmental Deterioration, it is 
necessary to rate the possibility of damage and detectability.  
ii. Service Data Collection System 
According to airworthiness regulation, aircraft operator and maintenance 
organization both have the responsibility to record service and maintenance 
data as the feedback to manufacturers. The output of such system could be 
the input of MSG-3 for improving scheduled maintenance plan. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Floor Structural Calculation 
 
A.1 Floor Beam 
A.1.1 Alternation of Material 
Aluminum alloy 7075-T7351 was chosen as the floor beam material by the 
designer in the Preliminary Design Phase. Meanwhile, there are two other 
types of aluminium alloy can be used for floor structures, which are 7075-T6 
and 2024-T351. The author compared these three types of aluminium alloy 
and made a decision in his personal point of view. 
Alloy 7075 7075 2024 
Temper T7351 T6 T351 
Formability Low Low Medium 
Machinability B B B 
General Corrosion Resistance C C D 
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Weldability D D C 
Brazeability D D D 
Anodizing Response B B C 
Stress Corrosion Cracking B C C 
 
According to the comparison, 7075-T7351 and 7075-T6 shows very similar 
characteristics. But 7075-T7351 performs better on Stress Corrosion Cracking. 
So 7075-T6 is out of consideration, and the final decision will be made 
between 7075-T7351 and 2024-T351. 
Aluminium alloys 2024-T3 and 7075-T7351 are widely used for structural parts 
in high performance aircraft components because of their high strength/weight 
ratio. They also have other favourable characteristics obtained through specific 
heat treatments. T3 treatment consists of solubility heating at a temperature of 
493℃, followed by a quench, cold work and natural ageing (ageing at room 
temperature). 2024-T3 alloys have an acceptable level of toughness. T7351 
treatment consists of solubility heating, followed by a quench, artificial ageing 
and stress relieving treatment. 7075-T7351 alloy has a high strength but low 
stress corrosion cracking characteristics in all stress directions. 
In conclusion, the aluminium alloy 2024-T351 was finally chosen for all these 
advantages.  
The material properties were found in the ESDU Metallic Material Data 
Handbook. 
 t1 = 259 Mpa, t2 = 265 Mpa, E = 70 Gpa, ν = 0.33, ρ = 2700 kg/m3 
With the equations 4.1 and 4.2 from the ESDU 76016, m and fn could be 
calculated as followed: 
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m =
logቀ
ε୰
ε୰ᇱ
ቁ
log ൬
fୖ
fୖ
ᇱ ൰
=
logቀ
0.001
0.002ቁ
log ቀ
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= 30.3 
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൨
ିଵ
୫ିଵ
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A.1.2 Verification on Previous Design of Floor Beam 
The floor beam used to be design in the preliminary design phase. Because of 
the changing on material, the author re-calculated the floor beam to check 
whether the original style can work well with the new material. 
In accordance with CCAR 25.561, the ultimate inertia force which the floor 
beams have to withstand is 6g downwards. This force is provided by 
passengers and seats. According to CCAR 25.562, the estimated mass of a 
passenger is 77kg, and the estimated mass of a seat is 11kg (2nd cohort). The 
floor beam was calculated as followed. 
Load from a 3-seat-assembly: 3 * (11 + 77) * 6 * 9.8 = 15523 N 
A safety factor of 1.5 was taken. 
The author took the single-class configuration with 136 economy seats under 
consideration. And there are 23 rows of seats and 52 floor beams underneath. 
So the load generated by 3-seat-assembly on each floor beam is:  
15523 * 23 * 1.5 / 52 = 10299 N 
Because there are 2 struts supporting each floor beam on both sides, and the 
following loading case was taken: 
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According to the Aircraft Design Handbook,  
 Mmax = P * a = 10299 N * 0.386 m = 3975 N*m 
The beam section and relavant datas defined in preliminary phase is followed: 
 
Ixx = 511411 mm4 
y = 50 mm 
Then, σ = Mmax * y / Ixx = 3975 N*m * 50mm / 511411 mm4 = 389 MPa 
RF = fn / σ = 241 / 389 = 0.62 < 1 
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Therefore, the original floor beam designed in the preliminary phase is not 
appropriate anymore due to the change of material. The author will explain his 
modification on floor beam in the following chapter. 
A.1.3 Modification on Floor Beam Design 
(INA needs to be more than 864130) 
The author modified the web thickness of the floor beam section from 2.5 mm 
to 4.5 mm (shown in the following figure), then re-calculate the strength. 
 
 
In accordance with the Aircraft Design Handbook 
Ixx = [ ah3 – ( a – t1 )b3 ] / 12 = [ 28 * 1003 – ( 28 – 4.5 ) * 953 ] / 12    
 = 857590 mm4 
Then, σ = Mmax * y / Ixx = 3975 N*m * 50mm / 857590 mm4 = 232 MPa 
Thus, RF = fn / σ = 241 / 232 = 1.04 > 1 
Maximum deflection: 
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Fa (3l2 – 4a2) / 24EIxx = 73 mm 
As it is an ultimate case, this deflection is acceptable. 
A.2 Floor Vertical Struts Calculation 
Vertical struts of floor beam were not mentioned in any report of preliminary 
design phase. But actually there are floor vertical struts in the CATIA model 
delivered by the 2nd cohort, without any information concerning material 
selections and strength calculations. In this situation, the author decided to 
verify the previous design using the new material firstly, and then made his 
own judgement and, probably, modifications. 
According to the result calculated in the last chapter, the load generated by 
3-seat-assembly on each floor beam is 10299 N. Additionally, the load from the 
two 3-seat assemblies in one row is equally carried by the vertical struts on 
both sides. So the load acting on each vertical struts, Fcolumn = 10299 N. 
A.2.1 Verification of Previous Floor Vertical Struts 
 
Cross section of floor vertical struts 
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Floor vertical struts 
σ = Fcritical / Acolumn = π2E/λ2 
λ = l / i 
i = (Imin / Acolumn)1/2 
Because, Ix = [ ah3 – (a – t1) b3 ] / 12 = 68458.67 mm4 
And, Iy = [ hx
__
3 – b(x
__
 - t1 )3 + at2 (a - x
__
)3 ] = 91486.33 mm4 
Hence, Imin = Ix = 68458.67 mm4 
Acolumn = 52 * 20 – 48 * 18 = 176 mm2 
i = (68458.67 / 176)1/2 = 19.7 
λ = 910 / 19.7 = 46.2 
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σcritical = 3.142 * 70 * 109 / 46.22 = 323 MPa 
Meanwhile, σ = Fcolumn / A = 10299 / 176e-6 = 54 MPa 
σ < σcritical 
Thus, the previous floor vertical struts can be used. 
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Appendix B Airworthiness Management in Group 
Design Project 
B.1 Tasks of Airworthiness Management 
 
Figure B-1 General Procedure of Civil Aircraft Type Certification 
During Detail Design Phase of a civil aircraft design, the tasks of airworthiness 
is to establish appropriate Certification Basis according to Certification Plan 
built in Conceptual Design Phase and Preliminary Design Phase, and to start 
to prepare for documents required by Type Certification. 
Certification Basis includes: 
 Applicable Regulations 
 Special Conditions 
 Equivalent Safety Findings 
 Exemptions  
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Being in charge of airworthiness management for structure design group within 
Detailed Design Phase of Flying Crane Aircraft, the author’s work was focused 
on the selection and adjustment of relevant airworthiness regulations, and 
collaboration with specific designers to fully implement those regulations into 
design philosophy and results. And the author’s work was based on the results 
from preliminary design phase. The tasks of airworthiness within detailed 
design phase include: 
 To help designers deeply understand the related items in the regulation 
combined with their mission. 
 To assist designers to choose items into designing as well as adjust the 
choice 
 To assist designers to optimize the means of compliance of chosen items 
 To ensure there are relevant materials to witness the means of appliance 
to chosen item 
 To make sure the fulfilment of compliance to the regulation during the 
whole course 
 To continuously improve the Airworthiness Compliance Matrix and check 
the reasonability of the material to witness the means of appliance. 
 To make sure there is reasonable explanation to the suitability of every 
item. 
 To make sure there is no contradiction in the applying of relevant items. 
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B.2 Certification Basis Establishment 
 
Figure B-2 Workflow of Certification Basis Establishment 
As previously mentioned, among the four sections of certification basis, the 
applicable regulations were taken in this study, and CCAR (China Civil 
Aviation Regulation) was selected as the regulation system to comply with by 
Flying Crane. 
The workflow of establishing certification basis and selecting applicable 
regulations was shown in Figure B-2. And the Certification Basis was 
interpreted in the means of ACM (Airworthiness Compliance Matrix). 
This matrix is an integrated description and index to airworthiness items. And 
its update is also an important way to execute the mission of airworthiness 
management. Explanation to airworthiness compliance matrix is shown in 
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Table B-1 and B-2. And the ACM of Flying Crane cabin layout is shown in 
Table 5-3. 
Table B-1 Explanation to MOC code and compliance status 
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Table B-2 Explanation to Airworthiness Compliance Matrix 
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Table B-3 Airworthiness Compliance Matrix for Cabin Layout 
  
ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
cabin 
layout 
Passenger 
cabin door 
25.783(a) 1B 
Each cabin must have at least one easily 
accessible external door. 
CATIA model 1 
25.783(b) 1A 
There must be a means to lock and safeguard 
each external door against opening in flight 
  1 
25.783(c) 1A,4A 
Each external door must be reasonably free 
from jamming as a result of fuselage 
deformation in a minor crash. 
  1,4 
25.783(d) 1A 
Each external door must be located where 
person using them will not be endangered by 
the propellers when appropriate operating 
procedures are used. 
  1 
25.783(e) 1A 
There must be a provision for direct visual 
inspection  
  1 
25.783(f) 1A 
External doors must have provisions to 
prevent the initiation of pressurization of the 
airplane to an unsafe level if the door is not 
fully closed and locked. In addition, it must be 
shown by safety analysis that inadvertent 
opening is extremely improbable. 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
25.783(h) 1B 
Each passenger entry door in the side of the 
fuselage must meet the applicable 
requirements of §25.807 through §25.813 for a 
Type II or larger passenger emergency exit.  
CATIA model 1 
25.783(j) 1A,4A 
All lavatory doors must be capable of being 
unlocked from the outside without the aid of 
special tools. 
  1,4 
Seats, berths, 
safety belts, and 
harnesses. 
25.785(a ) 1B 
A seat (or berth for a non-ambulant person) 
must be provided for each occupant who has 
reached his or her second birthday. 
CATIA model and report 1 
25.785(b ) 1A,4A 
Each seat, berth, safety belt, harness, and 
adjacent part of the airplane at each station 
designated will not suffer serious injury in an 
emergency landing  
  1,4 
25.785(c) 1A  Each seat or berth must be approved.   1 
25.785(e) 1A Demand to berth design   1 
25.785(f) 1A,4A 
Load demand to seat or berth, and its 
supporting structure, and each safety belt or 
harness and its anchorage   
  1,4 
25.785(f)(1) 1A,4A 
 The structural analysis and testing of the 
seats, berths, and their supporting structures 
may be determined by assuming that the 
critical load in the forward, sideward, 
  1,4 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
downward, upward, and rearward directions. 
25.785(f)(2) 1A,4A 
Each pilot seat must be designed for the 
reactions resulting from the application of the 
pilot forces prescribed in §25.395. 
  1,4 
25.785(f)(3) 1A,4A 
The inertia forces specified in §25.561 must be 
multiplied by a factor of 1.33 (instead of the 
fitting factor prescribed in §25.625) in 
determining the strength of the attachment of 
each seat to the structure and each belt or 
harness to the seat or structure. 
  1,4 
25.785(h)(1) 1B Demand to flight attendant seats   CATIA model 1 
25.785(h)(3) 1B 
Positioned so that the seat will not interfere 
with the use of a passageway or exit when the 
seat is not in use. 
CATIA model 1 
25.785(h)(4) 1A 
Either forward or rearward facing with an 
energy absorbing rest that is designed to 
support the arms, shoulders, head, and spine. 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
25.785(h)(5) 1A 
Equipped with a restraint system consisting of 
a combined safety belt and shoulder harness 
unit with a single point release. There must be 
means to secure each restraint system when 
not in use to prevent interference with rapid 
egress in an emergency 
  1 
25.785(i) 1A 
Each safety belt must be equipped with a 
metal to metal latching device. 
  1 
25.785(k) 1A 
Each projecting object that would injure 
persons seated or moving about the airplane 
in normal flight must be padded. 
  1 
 Stowage 
compartments 
25.787(a) 1A,4A 
Demand to compartment for the stowage of 
cargo, baggage, carry-on articles, and 
equipment (such as life rafts), and any other 
stowage compartment  
  1,4 
25.787(b) 1A 
Demand for means to prevent the contents in 
the compartments from becoming a hazard by 
shifting, under the loads specified in paragraph  
  1 
25.787(c) 1A 
If cargo compartment lamps are installed, 
each lamp must be installed so as to prevent 
contact between lamp bulb and cargo. 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
Retention of 
items of mass in 
passenger and 
crew 
compartments 
and galleys. 
25.789(a) 1A 
Demand for preventing each item of mass 
(that is part of the airplane type design) in a 
passenger or crew compartment or galley from 
becoming a hazard.  
  1 
25.789(b) 1A,4A 
Each interphone restraint system must be 
designed so that when subjected to the load 
factors specified in §25.561(b)(3), the 
interphone will remain in its stowed position 
  1,4 
Passenger 
information 
signs and 
placards.  
25.791(a) 1A Demand about smoking-related design    1 
25.791(b) 1A 
Demand for signs that notify when seat belts 
should be fastened and that are installed to 
comply with the operating rules of this chapter 
must be operable by a member of the 
flightcrew and, when illuminated, must be 
legible under all probable conditions of cabin 
illumination to each person seated in the 
cabin. 
  1 
25.791(c) 1A 
 A placard must be located on or adjacent to 
the door of each receptacle used for the 
disposal of flammable waste materials to 
indicate that use of the receptacle for disposal 
of cigarettes, etc., is prohibited. 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
25.791(d) 1A 
 Lavatories must have "No Smoking" or "No 
Smoking in Lavatory" placards conspicuously 
located on or adjacent to each side of the entry 
door. 
  1 
Floor surfaces 25.793 1A,4A 
The floor surface of all areas must have slip 
resistant properties (may be wet in servicing). 
  1,4 
Emergency 
exits.  
25.807（a)(3) 1B Configuration of Type III.  CATIA model 1 
25.807（a)(8) 1B Configuration of Type B.   CATIA model 1 
25.807（f)(1) 1B 
Each required passenger emergency exit must 
be accessible to the passengers and located 
where it will afford the most effective means of 
passenger evacuation. 
CATIA model 1 
25.807（f)(4) 1B 
Demand to emergency exit for an airplane that 
is required to have more than one passenger 
emergency exit   
CATIA model 1 
25.807（g)(6) 1B 
For a passenger seating configuration of more 
than 110 seats, the emergency exits in each 
side of the fuselage must include at least two 
Type I or larger exits 
CATIA model 1 
25.807（g)(8) 1B 
If a Type A, Type B, or Type C exit is installed, 
there must be at least two Type C or larger 
exits in each side of the fuselage. 
CATIA model 1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
Emergency exits 
arrangement  
25.809(a) 1A 
Each emergency exit, including a flight crew 
emergency exit, must be a movable door or 
hatch in the external walls of the fuselage, 
allowing unobstructed opening to the outside. 
  1 
25.809(b) 1A 
 Each emergency exit must be openable from 
the inside and the outside except that sliding 
window emergency exits in the flight crew area 
need not be openable from the outside if other 
approved exits are convenient and readily 
accessible to the flight crew area. Each 
emergency exit must be capable of being 
opened 
  1 
25.809(e) 1A,4A 
Each emergency exit must be shown by tests, 
or by a combination of analysis and tests, to 
meet the requirements of paragraphs (b) and 
(c) of this section 
  1,4 
25.809(f) 1A 
Demand of means to lock each emergency 
exit and to safeguard against its opening in 
flight  
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
Emergency 
egress assist 
means and 
escape routes 
25.810(a) 1A,4A 
Each non over-wing Type A, Type B or Type C 
exit, and any other non over-wing landplane 
emergency exit more than 1.83m (6 feet) from 
the ground with the airplane on the ground and 
the landing gear extended, must have an 
approved means to assist the occupants in 
descending to the ground. 
  1,4 
Emergency exit 
marking 
25.811(a) 1A 
Each passenger emergency exit, its means of 
access, and its means of opening must be 
conspicuously marked. 
  1 
25.811(b) 1A 
The identity and location of each passenger 
emergency exit must be recognizable from a 
distance equal to the width of the cabin. 
  1 
25.811(c) 1A 
Means must be provided to assist the 
occupants in locating the exits in conditions of 
dense smoke. 
  1 
25.811(d) 1A 
 The location of each passenger emergency 
exit must be indicated by a sign visible to 
occupants approaching along the main 
passenger aisle (or aisles) 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
25.811(d)(1) 1A 
A passenger emergency exit locator sign 
above the aisle (or aisles) near each 
passenger emergency exit, or at another 
overhead location if it is more practical 
because of low headroom, except that one 
sign may serve more than one exit if each exit 
can be seen readily from the sign; 
  1 
25.811(d)(2) 1A 
A passenger emergency exit marking sign 
next to each passenger emergency exit, 
except that one sign may serve two such exits 
if they both can be seen readily from the sign 
  1 
25.811(d)(3) 1A 
A sign on each bulkhead or divider that 
prevents fore and aft vision along the 
passenger cabin to indicate emergency exits 
beyond and obscured by the bulkhead or 
divider, except that if this is not possible the 
sign may be placed at another appropriate 
location. 
  1 
25.811(e)(1) 1A 
Each passenger emergency exit must have, 
on or near the exit, a marking that is readable 
from a distance of 30 inches. 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
  
25.811(e)(2) 1A 
Each Type A, Type B, Type C or Type I 
passenger emergency exit operating handle 
must--  
(ⅰ)Be self-illuminated with an initial 
brightness of at least 160 micro－lamberts; or 
(ii) Be conspicuously located and well 
illuminated by the emergency lighting even in 
conditions of occupant crowding at the exit. 
  1 
25.811(f) 1A 
 Each emergency exit that is required to be 
openable from the outside, and its means of 
opening, must be marked on the outside of the 
airplane. In addition, the following apply 
  1 
25.811(f)(1) 1A 
The outside marking for each passenger 
emergency exit in the side of the fuselage 
must include a 50mm (2-inch) colored band 
outlining the exit. 
  1 
25.811(f)(2) 1A Demand to outside marking including the band   1 
Emergency 
lighting 
25.812(a) 1A,4A 
An emergency lighting system, independent of 
the main lighting system, must be installed. 
However, the sources of general cabin 
illumination may be common to both the 
emergency and the main lighting systems if 
the power supply to the emergency lighting 
  1,4 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
system is independent of the power supply to 
the main lighting system 
Emergency exit 
access 
25.813 1A 
Each required emergency exit must be 
accessible to the passengers and located 
where it will afford an effective means of 
evacuation. 
  1 
25.813(a) 1B 
Demand for passageway leading from the 
nearest main aisle to each Type A, Type B, 
Type C, Type I, or Type II emergency exit and 
between individual passenger areas.   
CATIA model 1 
25.813(a)(1) 1A 
A cross-aisle which leads directly to each 
passageway between the nearest main aisle 
and a Type A or B exit; and  
  1 
25.813(a)(2) 1A 
A cross-aisle which leads to the immediate 
vicinity of each passageway between the 
nearest main aisle and a Type 1, Type II, or 
Type III exit; except that when two Type III 
exits are located within three passenger rows 
of each other, a single cross-aisle may be 
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
used if it leads to the vicinity between the 
passageways from the nearest main aisle to 
each exit 
25.813(b) 1A 
Adequate space to allow crewmember(s) to 
assist in the evacuation of passengers must 
be provided as follows 
  1 
25.813(b)(1) 1A 
The assist space must not reduce the 
unobstructed width of the passageway below 
that required for the exit 
  1 
25.813(b)(2) 1B 
For each Type A or Type B exit, assist space 
must be provided at each side of the exit 
regardless of whether a means is required by 
§25.810(a) to assist passengers in descending 
to the ground from that exit.  
CATIA model 1 
25.813(e) 1B 
No door may be installed in any partition 
between passenger compartments 
CATIA model 1 
Width of aisle  25.815 1B 
The passenger aisle width at any point 
between seats must equal or exceed the 
values sepicified 
CATIA model 1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
Maximum 
number of seats 
abreast  
25.817 1B 
On airplanes having only one passenger aisle, 
no more than three seats abreast may be 
placed on each side of the aisle in any one 
row. 
CATIA model 1 
Pressurized 
cabins 
25.841 1A,4A 
Pressurized cabins and compartments to be 
occupied must be equipped to provide a cabin 
pressure altitude of not more than 2400m 
(8,000 feet) at the maximum operating altitude 
of the airplane under normal operating 
conditions. 
  
1 
 
4 
Tests for 
pressurized 
cabins. 
25.843 4A 
Strength testand functional tests of pressure 
cabin must be done. 
  4 
safety 
equipment 
25.1411(a) 1A 
Accessibility. Required safety equipment to be 
used by the crew in an emergency must be 
readily accessible.  
  1 
25.1411(b) 1A Demand to Stowage provisions.     1 
25.1411(c) 1A 
(c) Emergency exit descent device. The 
stowage provisions for the emergency exit 
descent device required by §25.809(f) must be 
at the exits for which they are intended.  
  1 
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ITEM 
DESCRIPTION 
CCAR25 
REFERNCE 
COMPLIANCE 
STATUS 
REQUIREMENT 
MEANS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
MOC 
CODE 
25.1411(d)(1) 1B 
(1) The stowage provisions for the liferafts 
described in §25.1415 must accommodate 
enough rafts for the maximum number of 
occupants for which certification for ditching is 
requested.  
  1 
25.1411(d)(2) 1B 
(2) Liferafts must be stowed near exits through 
which the rafts can be launched during an 
unplanned ditching.  
  1 
25.1411(d)(3) 1A 
(3) Rafts automatically or remotely released 
outside the airplane must be attached to the 
airplane by means of the static line prescribed 
in §25.1415.  
  1 
25.1411(d)(4) 1A 
The stowage provisions for each portable 
liferaft must allow rapid detachment and 
removal of the raft for use at other than the 
intended exits.  
  1 
25.851 1A Fire Extinguishers CATIA Model and Report 1 
Floor 
25,793 1A Floor Surface CATIA Model and Report 1 
25.561(3)(iv) 1A 
The occupant experiences the following 
ultimate inertia forces acting separately 
relative to the surrounding structure: 
downward, 6.0g 
CATIA Model and Report 1 
 
